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AND DEATH SHALL HAVE NO DOMINION * HOW TO
ACHIEVE THE CATEGORICAL EXEMPTION OF
MENTALLY RETARDED DEFENDANTS FROM
EXECUTION
J. Amy Dillard **
"[D]oes the system accurately and consistently determine which
defendants 'deserve' to die?"
-Justice Harry Blackmun *
I. INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the Supreme Court of the United States handed
down its opinion in Atkins v. Virginia, exempting mentally re-
tarded capital defendants from execution,' the American Bar As-
sociation ("ABA") issued two legislative options for states to adopt
in order to comply with the directive of Atkins.2 Alternative A rec-
* DYLAN THOMAS, AND DEATH SHALL HAVE No DOMINION (1937), reprinted in THE
POEMS OF DYLAN THOMAS 49-50 (Daniel Jones ed., 1971).
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. J.D., Washing-
ton and Lee University Law School; B.A., Wellesley College.
This article arises from my past and current work as a capital defender. I could never
have imagined or written this piece without the guiding hand of Professor Roger Groot. I
have missed him at every step in the execution of this piece. I lift up my many thanks to
him. Professor Penelope Pether's thoughtful contributions, particularly in the early stage
of this work, were invaluable. I thank the Southeastern Association of Law Schools for ac-
cepting this paper in its junior scholars program and Professor Arnold Loewy for his valu-
able comments; Dean Phil Closius and the University of Baltimore for supporting this
scholarship; my colleagues, Professors Dionne Koller, Nancy Modesitt, Kimberly Brown,
and Margaret Johnson for their dedicated thinking about criminal law, which is well out-
side of their bailiwick; and Karen Woody.
*** Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from deni-
al of certiorari).
1. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2. James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State Legis-
lative Issues, MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP., Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 11, 16-17; see
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 ('"[We leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate
ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences."' (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986))).
961
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ommended that, upon notice from defense counsel that she had a
good faith belief that her capital client was mentally retarded, the
trial judge should conduct a pretrial hearing to determine if the
defendant is mentally retarded and, thus, not death-eligible.3 Al-
ternative B recommended that, upon notice from defense counsel
that she had a good faith belief that her capital client was men-
tally retarded, the judge should empanel a jury for the sole pur-
pose of determining if the defendant is mentally retarded and,
thus, not death-eligible.4 By adopting either option, the mental
retardation assessment would be kept away5 from the death-
qualified juror,6 who might be inclined to ignore the core values of
the criminal justice system and, more narrowly, the rationale in
Atkins.7 With either ABA-suggested procedure, the trial court
could assure due process for the mentally retarded capital defen-
dant.
The Virginia General Assembly actively rejected these reason-
able recommendations from the ABA in favor of continuing to en-
trust the death-qualified jury with the mental retardation deter-
mination, effectively employing the same process that resulted in
Daryl Atkins's original death sentence. Virginia's post-Atkins
3. Ellis, supra note 2, at 17.
4. Id.
5. I use the phrase "kept away" on purpose. Years of practice as a capital defender
inform my opinion about the bias of death-qualified jurors, and scholars have doubts about
the citizenry's ability to delve, unbiased, into a life or death assessment after hearing the
evidence of guilt. See ScoTT E. SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE
DEATH PENALTY 177 (2005). In the abstract, I would put the question of determining men-
tal retardation to the person or group best able to contemplate the objective facts that
might support a finding of mental retardation, but I am more inclined to rely on the ability
of the death-qualified judge to set aside his personal views and render an untainted or pre-
tainted determination on mental retardation. While this article does not purport to engage
with the extensive writings of John Rawls, I will note that I am, expressly, afraid of
Rawls's "public sense of justice" because it could ignore the Eighth Amendment interpreta-
tion in Atkins. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 496-504 (1971).
6. For a discussion of "death-qualified" juries, see Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162,
173 (1986); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 416 (1985); and Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510, 518 (1968). In order to sit on a capital jury panel, a potential juror must demon-
strate that he is willing to sentence the defendant to death. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522
n.21. Those jury candidates who express a categorical opposition to the death penalty are
ineligible to sit on a capital jury panel. Id. The voir dire process used in selecting jurors for
a capital trial is sometimes referred to as "death-qualifying" or "Witherspoon-ing" the jury
panel. For more on the biases of the typical death-qualified juror, see infra Part IV.
7. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-19 (2002) (offering two rationales for its de-
cision to exempt).
8. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B)(iv) (Cum. Supp. 2010) ("Facts in mitigation [of
the offense] may include ... at the time of the commission of the capital felony, the capaci-
ty of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
962 [Vol. 45:961
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method for determining mental retardation has not been re-
viewed by the Supreme Court of the United States, but Atkins's
own journey through the capital punishment maze offers an ex-
ample of the flaws in Virginia's procedure. Three different death-
qualified jury panels sentenced Daryl Atkins to death. 0 The first
apparently disregarded the testimony that Atkins was "mildly
mentally retarded" and the instruction that such evidence should
be treated as a mitigating factor in the sentencing." At the first
resentencing, after a reversal from the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia," a new jury panel heard more complete and detailed evidence
from Dr. Evan Nelson, who concluded that Atkins's full-scale IQ
was fifty-nine, making him one of only two capital defendants out
of over forty that he had tested, who qualified as mentally re-
tarded.13 In this resentencing hearing, the Commonwealth offered
expert testimony from Stanton Samenow, who, without adminis-
tering an intelligence test, concluded that Atkins was of "average
intelligence, at least."14 The second jury panel reconciled the con-
the requirements of law was significantly impaired."). The Virginia General Assembly did
add a statute explaining how the capital jury should assess the evidence of mental retar-
dation, but it did not require the capital jury to make that determination independently
from the overall mitigation assessment required by Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4. See
generally id. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2010). When read together, the two statutes
imply that a finding of mental retardation could be viewed by the jury as a mere mitigator
rather than as a "categorical exemption" to a death sentence. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315-
16.
9. For a discussion of death-qualified juries, see supra note 6.
10. See Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 314 (Va. 2000) (discussing the first
two juries to sentence Atkins to death); Bill Geroux, Death-Row Inmate Isn't Retarded, A
Jury Rules, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 6, 2005, at Al (discussing the third jury to
sentence Atkins to death). Atkins's predecessor as the named defendant in the mental re-
tardation and capital punishment debate, Johnny Paul Penry, has also been sentenced to
death three times, by three different death-qualified jury panels. See Mike Tolson, An End
to a Legal Saga, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 15, 2008, at Bl. Each of those juries ignored mitigat-
ing evidence that Penry's IQ was below seventy and that he had the intellectual function-
ing of a seven-year-old. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 302 (1989); Tolson, supra. Like
Atkins, Penry's life has been spared; though no death-qualified jury panel has ever spared
his life, prosecutors agreed to a plea that resulted in Penry's life sentence. Tolson, supra.
11. See Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445, 451-52 (Va. 1999).
12. Id. at 456-57 (reversing the penalty phase because the trial court used a mislead-
ing verdict form).
13. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n.5. ("[Atkins'] full scale IQ is 59. Compared to the
population at large, that means less than one percentile. . . . Mental retardation is a rela-
tively rare thing. It's about one percent of the population.").
14. Id. at 309 & n.6. Dr. Stanton Samenow has played an interesting role in capital
prosecutions in Virginia, having been responsible for evaluating Percy Walton, whose
death sentenced was commuted by Governor Tim Kaine after he found him mentally in-
competent to be put to death. See Walton v. Johnson, 269 F. Supp. 2d 692, 694 (W.D. Va.
2003); Jerry Markon, Va. Governor Commutes Death Sentence, WASH. POST, June 10,
2011] 963
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flicting testimony again, apparently disregarding the compelling
evidence offered by the defense, and sentenced Atkins to death. 5
Even after Atkins's case was returned to a jury panel for a
third sentencing hearing-after the Supreme Court of the United
States found that execution of a mentally retarded defendant vi-
olates the Eighth Amendmentls the third jury also apparently
disregarded both the evidence of mental retardation and the jury
instruction that a mentally retarded defendant should be categor-
ically exempt from a death sentence, and sentenced Atkins to
death. 7 The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and remanded
the case for a new sentencing hearing because of procedural flaws
that resulted in the death-qualified jury finding that Atkins had
failed to establish "significantly subaverage intellectual function-
ing" and "significant limitations in adaptive behavior."', This de-
cision by the Supreme Court of Virginia did not reach review by
the Supreme Court of the United States due to a finding of prose-
cutorial misconduct that spared Atkins's life. 9
2008, at B1.
15. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307. The Supreme Court of Virginia refused to "commute
Atkins' sentence of death to life imprisonment merely because of his IQ score," thus ac-
knowledging that the testimony from Evan Nelson-that Atkins had an IQ of fifty-nine,
well within the range for a diagnosis of mental retardation-was credible. Atkins v. Com-
monwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 321 (Va. 2000). The dissent was more explicit in its wholesale
rejection of the Commonwealth's evidence, rejecting Stanton "Samenow's opinion that
[Atkins] possesses average intelligence [as] incredulous as a matter of law," and concluded
that "the imposition of the sentence of death upon a criminal defendant who has the men-
tal age of a child between the ages of 9 and 12 is excessive." Id. at 323-24 (noting that
Samenow did not administer an intelligence test). Psychologists have recognized the diffi-
culty in defining mental retardation to satisfy trial courts, emphasizing that using a magic
number-like seventy-has problems since there is no single IQ test used in the communi-
ty. See generally Paul B. Herbert & Kathryn A. Young, Penry Revisited: Is Execution of a
Person Who Has Mental Retardation Cruel and Unusual?, 30 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L.
282, 284 (2002) (discussing the psychiatric standards for "mental retardation").
16. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1985)).
17. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 631 S.E.2d 93, 95 (Va. 2006).
18. Id. at 94,95 & n.2 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2010));
see also THOMAS WALKER, ELIGIBLE FOR EXECUTION: THE STORY OF THE DARYL ATKINS
CASE 243, 259-60 (2009).
19. See generally Jon Cawley, Prosecutorial Misconduct Case Against York-Poquoson
Commonwealth's Attorney Moves Forward, DAILY PRESS (Newport News), Mar. 6, 2010,
http://articles.dailypress.com/2010-03-06/news/dp-local-addison_0306mar06_1_misconduct
-arkins-and-williams-jones-cathy-krinick (noting that the State Bar's Sixth District Sub-
committee certified the complaints of misconduct to the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary
Board); Jon Cawley, Prosecutor Again Charged with Misconduct, DAILY PRESS (Newport
News), Feb. 22, 2011, http://www.dailypress.com/news/york-county/dp-nws-york-addison-
20110222,0,2862966.story (noting that Eileen Addison, the prosecutor in the Atkins trial,
was exonerated of the misconduct charges that led to the commutation of Atkins's death
[Vol. 45:961964
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The Atkins saga demonstrates the overworked postconviction
process in capital cases, 20 and this article argues for due process
protection at the trial level for mentally retarded defendants. 2 1
Scholars agree that special protections given to capital defen-
dants under the Eighth Amendment are unrealized in practice
without procedures to guarantee the protections. 22 Some argue
that the Court's use of "the Eighth Amendment as the primary
vehicle for guaranteeing the heightened reliability of capital pro-
cedures" is conceptually weak. 23 Pursuant to the Court's decision
to "leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways
to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of
sentences,"24 the states have responded with a myriad of proce-
sentence from death to life, but remains under investigation for misconduct in three addi-
tional murder prosecutions); Adam Liptak, Lawyer Reveals Secret, Toppling Death Sen-
tence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2008, at Al. Atkins's life had been spared by the time that it
took for the final leg in the appellate process to unfold. See WALKER, supra note 18, at
262-78. Defense counsel was able to continue investigation from the time of Atkins's con-
viction in 1998 through the appellate process, which seemed to be reaching a close in 2006,
with the remand from the third death sentence. See id. at 260, 278. Atkins suffered three
death warrants only to have his death sentence commuted to life because of prosecutorial
misconduct that was discovered over eight years after the first death warrant. Id. at 262-
63, 267. That the revelation of prosecutorial misconduct in Atkins has spared his life ra-
ther than the Court's ignored, near-directive that he be categorically exempted from a
death sentence based on his obvious mental retardation, represents a travesty wrapped in
irony.
20. See Lee Kovarsky, Death Ineligibility and Habeas Corpus, 95 CORNELL L. REV.
329, 368-70 (2010) (describing the postconviction process). Some maintain that the post-
conviction process is flawed by a lack of interest and in-depth review at the appellate level.
Perhaps the most convincing criticism has come from Justice John Paul Stevens. See Su-
san Estrich et al., Op-Ed., My Boss, Justice Stevens, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2010, at WK11
("Years later, I talked about that night with Justice Stevens. He had lost faith in the fair-
ness of the death penalty, because no one paid the kind of attention that he had, and Jus-
tice Stewart had, and Justice Marshall had, that night long ago. When I asked him why he
had changed, he told me that on this, as on so many questions, he had not changed at all.
The court had.").
21. Like Justice John Paul Stevens, the author has little faith in the depth of atten-
tion and review given by appellate courts in capital cases, especially in reviewing facts.
See Estrich, supra note 20.
22. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Selling a Quick Fix for Boot Hill: The Myth of
Justice Delayed in Death Cases, in THE KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW,
POLITICS, AND CULTURE 148, 163-64 (Austin Sarat ed., 1999) (discussing Supreme Court
habeas corpus jurisprudence under the Eighth Amendment); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M.
Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation
of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 357-58 (1995).
23. See Adam Thurschwell, Federal Courts, the Death Penalty, and the Due Process
Clause: The Original Understanding of the "Heightened Reliability" of Capital Trials, 14
FED. SENT'G REP. 14, 15 (2001). Thurschwell gives a thorough examination of the flaws of
the Eighth Amendment approach with an exegesis of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466 (2000). Thurschwell, supra, at 15-16.
24. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
2011]1 965
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dures.2 5 Some states, like Virginia, leave the task of determining
mental retardation exclusively within the control of the jury,26
while other states have given the task to the trial judge,"2 and
still others allow for a determination by either the judge or the
jury.8 Some state legislatures have declined to address the proce-
dure for implementing the Atkins decision at all.29 This article
contends that trial courts should employ procedures that will
guarantee that mentally retarded defendants will not be wrongly
sentenced to death and that any procedure that charges only the
death-qualified jury with determining whether a defendant is
mentally retarded is constitutionally flawed.30 That is, such a pro-
cedure fails to comport with the requirements of due process as
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as guaranteed
by the Eighth Amendment."
This article addresses how trial courts should employ proce-
dures to accomplish "heightened reliability"32 in the mental retar-
399, 416-17 (1986)) (alterations in original).
25. For a full view of the states' responses to the Court's directive from Atkins, see
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Atkins v. Virginia: Lessons From Substance and
Procedure in the Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 721,
724-29 (2008).
26. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(c) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
27. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515A(2) (Cum. Supp. 2010); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 174.098(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2006).
28. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005(c), (e) (2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
701.10b(E), (F) (West Cum. Supp. 2010).
29. See, e.g., Yeomans v. State, 898 So. 2d 878, 901 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) ("The Ala-
bama Legislature has yet to enact a statute to address the holding in Atkins."); State v.
Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (Ohio 2002) (setting forth the procedural guidelines Ohio
courts should follow in determining whether a defendant facing capital punishment is
mentally retarded "in the absence of a statutory framework" to make this determination);
see also Anna M. Hagstrom, Atkins v. Virginia: An Empty Holding Devoid of Justice for
the Mentally Retarded, 27 LAW & INEQ. 241, 242 (2009) (noting that "some state legisla-
tures have declined to act on [the mental retardation] issue at all"). Some states, like Mar-
yland, have remained silent in their legislation, yet have left the question of mental retar-
dation with the jury. See Richardson v. State, 598 A.2d 1, 3-4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
30. For a broad critique of the Court's "shar[ed] constitutional decisionmaking with
capital sentencing juries, state appellate courts, and state legislatures," see James S.
Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 1963-
2006, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2007).
31. U.S. CONsT. amends. V, VIII, XIV § 1. Atkins hinges the two requirements in a
new way. See Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 14 ("Since 1972, when the Supreme Court
suddenly turned to the Eighth Amendment and its 'evolving standards of decency' analysis
as the primary mode for analyzing the legitimacy of death penalty procedures, historical
analysis has played little role in the Court's capital jurisprudence." (citing Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 280 (1976))).
32. See Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 342 (1993) ("Mhe Eighth Amendment re-
[Vol. 45:961966
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dation determination to accomplish the Supreme Court's directive
for categorical exclusion, and it maintains that if a mentally re-
tarded defendant is subjected to a death sentence, then the
Atkins directive has been ignored.3 To satisfy the Atkins Court's
objective of protecting mentally retarded defendants from the
"special risk of wrongful execution,"34 trial courts should employ a
unified competency assessment in all capital cases where the de-
fendant asserts mental retardation as a bar to execution. The tri-
al court should employ the in favorem vitae5 doctrine in its re-
view of the evidence presented at the unified competency
assessment. A pretrial determination of mental retardation would
ensure fairness for defendants who may be at special risk "that
the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may
call for a less severe penalty."3 6
The article proceeds in six parts. Part II will offer an overview
of the Court's defendant-specific proportionality analysis, found
in Atkins and Roper v. Simmons,"3 and will explore how those cas-
es can be read together to establish a constitutional procedure for
assessing mental retardation. Part III explains how the applica-
tion of the traditional pretrial competency assessment, required
by Dusky v. United States,"3 would offer an opportunity to assess a
defendant's competency to face trial where a death sentence is a
possibility, thus guaranteeing due process to ensure heightened
reliability in the categorical exemption created by the Atkins
Court.3 1 Part IV details the historical categorical exemptions from
quires a greater degree of accuracy and factfinding than would be true in a noncapital
case." (citations omitted)); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 856 (1988) ("Under the
Eighth Amendment, the death penalty has been treated differently from all other punish-
ments." (citation omitted)); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976).
33. The only way that the categorical exemption against executing the mentally re-
tarded can have any meaning is through a procedure that will heighten the reliability of
the mental retardation determination. "The fundamental Eighth Amendment question is
simply whether the individual and crime merit the death penalty, and not whether the
procedures by which that question is answered are adequate-which is the question asked
under the Due Process Clause." Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 16.
34. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
35. In favorem vitae means "[iun favor of life." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 847 (9th ed.
2009). The doctrine demands that judges construe capital punishment statutes strictly
and exercise special care with the procedural rights of capital defendants. See MATTHEW
HALE, 2 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE [HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN] 305 (1st
Am. ed. 1736).
36. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
37. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317-21.
38. 362 U.S. 402, 402-03 (1960) (per curiam).
39. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
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a death sentence and how trial courts have applied the doctrine of
in favorem vitae in capital cases to spare undeserving defendants
from a death sentence. Part V examines the "two-edged sword" of
mental retardation,40 and how jurors and prosecutors pose a risk
of disregarding the Court's directive in Atkins. Part VI concludes
with a discussion of how, beyond guaranteeing due process, a uni-
fied theory for assessing competency in capital cases would simpl-
ify procedures, reduce costs, and put an end to some extensive
postconviction litigation like that in Atkins.4
II. DEFENDANT-SPECIFIC PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS: READING
ATKINS AND ROPER AS A BODY OF LAW
In Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme
Court of the United States declared that execution of a mentally
retarded or juvenile defendant was unconstitutional.4 In the ca-
non of capital punishment jurisprudence, Atkins and Roper are
proportionality cases; "it is a precept of justice that punishment
for [a] crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] of-
fense."43 As grounds for the new exemptions, the Court relied on
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, as viewed through the modern common law consti-
tutionalist lens of a majority of the sitting justices,4 and found
mentally retarded and juvenile defendants "categorically less
culpable than the average criminal.""
40. Id. at 321 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 324 (1989)).
41. Posttrial litigation over the defendant's competency to be executed extends beyond
the mental retardation question into questions of serious mental illness. See Panetti v.
Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 957-60 (2007).
42. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
43. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367
(1910)). The Court's proportionality review has generally focused on specific crimes. For
example, the Court has declared that a death sentence cannot be proportionate to crimes
that do not involve the death of another. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. -, , 128
S. Ct. 2641, 2664 (2008) (holding that a death sentence is not proportionate to the crime of
rape of a child); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977) (holding that a death sentence
is not proportionate to the crime of rape of an adult woman).
44. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 ("[O]bjective evidence, though of great importance, [does]
not 'wholly determine' the controversy, 'for the Constitution contemplates that in the end
our own judgment will be brought to bear on ... the acceptability of the death penalty un-
der the Eighth Amendment."' (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 597)).
45. Roper, 543 U.S. at 567 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316).
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Though the Court declared that mentally retarded and juvenile
defendants should be "categorically excluded from execution,"46 it
declined to implement any procedure to ensure categorical exclu-
sion for mentally retarded defendants, anticipating future diffi-
culties "in determining which offenders are in fact retarded."47 A
comprehensive, close reading of Atkins and Roper reveals that the
Court employed a unified rule and rationale to reach its conclu-
sion that mentally retarded and juvenile defendants should be ca-
tegorically excluded from execution,^4 and as such, trial courts
would be justified in engaging in similar procedures to ensure
compliance with the Court's rule.49
A. Rationales to Support the Categorical Exemption of Mentally
Retarded Defendants from Execution
The Court identifies two reasons for exempting mentally re-
tarded defendants from execution: the lack of penological purpose
in death and the risk of an unfair trial.5o Justice Scalia's dissent-
ing opinion offers the best explanation for the former." As sup-
port for the latter, the Court delineates anticipated pretrial prob-
lems, such as susceptibility to give false confessions; trial
problems, such as an inability to assist counsel or serve as a use-
46. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 ("A majority of states have
rejected the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile[s] . . . and we now hold this is re-
quired by the Eighth Amendment.").
47. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
48. Reading Atkins in the context of Roper is a novel scholarly argument.
49. Examining the strength of the right to be exempted from the imposition of death
might influence the type of procedure necessary to guarantee that right. The evidence of
an evolving standard of decency toward protecting the mentally retarded from execution
was stronger than the evolving standard of decency toward protecting juveniles from ex-
ecution. The rate of states abolishing the death penalty for mentally retarded defendants
was moving at a faster clip than the pace of change for juveniles. Between Penry and
Atkins, sixteen states changed their laws to exempt the mentally retarded from execution.
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 565. In contrast, only five states moved to exempt juveniles from
execution between Stanford v. Kentucky and Roper, the case that overturned Stanford. See
Roper, 543 U.S. at 565; Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). This begs analysis
of whether the mentally retarded deserve a stronger procedural protection to secure the
guarantee. Arguably, under the Court's majoritarian, evolving standards of decency anal-
ysis, society is more prepared to categorically exclude mentally retarded defendants from
execution than it is prepared to exclude juveniles.
50. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21.
51. Id. at 337, 340-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ful witness for the defense; and sentencing problems, such as a
jury's disregard for mental retardation as a mitigating factor.2
1. Core Values
The core values of the criminal justice system demand that
each punishment serve some societal goal. 5 The Supreme Court
of the United States has embraced two theories of punishment as
justification for execution: "retribution and deterrence of capital
crimes by prospective offenders."14 Unless execution "measurably
contributes to one or both of these goals, it 'is nothing more than
the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,'
and hence an unconstitutional punishment."55 For retribution, the
Court has developed its narrowing jurisprudence by examining
the nature of the crime to determine whether the defendant had
committed one of the most serious; for example, the Court has ex-
cluded from the sanction of the death penalty all crimes where
the victim did not perish.5 6 Even among murderers, the Court ex-
cludes from death those crimes that do not reflect "a conscious-
ness materially more 'depraved' than that of any person guilty of
murder."5 Based on the cognitive and rational deficiencies in the
mentally retarded defendant, the Court has concluded that the
mentally retarded defendant has lesser culpability, and thus, is
less deserving of the ultimate sanction than those defendants
without impairment.58 Because this exclusion is a categorical, ra-
ther than case-by-case, assessment, the Court concluded that no
person who is mentally retarded will ever be culpable enough to
deserve death.59
52. Id. at 320-21.
53. The classic theories of punishment are deterrence, retribution, public safety (inca-
pacitation), and education (rehabilitation). See SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW
AND ITS PROCESS: CASES AND MATERIALS 79 (8th ed. 2007).
54. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
55. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 592 (1977)).
56. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S.., , , 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650, 2665 (2008);
Coker, 433 U.S. at 598, 621 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
57. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980).
58. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-19 (2002).
59. Id. I use the vague "to be" here because the Court gives no direction on how a trial
court should determine if a defendant is mentally retarded, whether the defendant or gov-
ernment should bear the burden of proving or disproving mental retardation, or when this
determination should be made. In Part III, I begin to unravel the necessary complexities
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To satisfy a deterrence theory of punishment, the Court has
looked to see whether the imposition of a death sentence in one
case will affect "the 'cold calculus that precedes the decision' of
other potential murderers." 60 The Court has concluded that poten-
tial murderers who are mentally retarded lack the capacity to en-
gage in the logical reasoning necessary to connect their impulsive
conduct with a future punishment of death.6 1 Moreover, the Court
has found that potential murderers who are not mentally re-
tarded will experience lesser deterrence from the fact that men-
tally retarded murderers are exempted from the imposition of
death."2
The characteristics of mental retardation defined by the Court
that affect the theory of punishment analysis are relevant to the
mentally retarded defendant's capacity just before the crime, dur-
ing the crime, and at the time of execution.63 Mental retardation
operates like "insanity-lite" for the Atkins Court.14 The Court re-
cognizes that some mentally retarded defendants will not be able
to distinguish right from wrong, the classic element under the
narrow M'Naghten insanity test.6 5 But for those mentally re-
tarded defendants who will not meet the M'Naghten standard for
being found insane at the time of the offense, the symptoms of
"diminished capacities to understand and process information, to
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from expe-
rience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to
to the Court's proclamation that a mentally retarded defendant should be categorically
exempted from the imposition of the death penalty.
60. Id. at 319 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976)).
61. Id. at 320.
62. Id. Most critics think that the theory of deterrence is an exercise in theory with no
practical effect. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, A Reader's Companion to Against Predic-
tion: A Reply to Ariela Gross, Yoram Margalioth, and Yoav Sapir on Economic Modeling,
Selective Incapacitation, Governmentality, and Race, 33 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 265, 272
(2008). That the Court engages the theory, to seemingly absurd conclusions, secures the
analysis that the mentally retarded defendant is different enough, based on diagnosis
alone, to warrant an exemption from the imposition of death no matter how heinous his
crime.
63. ABA DEATH PENALTY MORATORIUM IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT, STATE DEATH
PENALTY ASSESSMENTS KEY FINDINGS (2007), http://www.abanet.org/moratorium/assess
mentproject/keyfindings.pdf.
64. Since the insanity defense is used rarely (in less than one percent of felony cases)
and succeeds even less often, it follows that the Court wanted to ease the burden of prov-
ing insanity for mentally retarded defendants. Randy Borum & Solomon M. Fulero, Em-
pirical Research on the Insanity Defense and Attempted Reforms: Evidence Toward In-
formed Policy, 23 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 375, 378 (1999).
65. Daniel M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) 719, 723.
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understand the reactions of others" operate as an exemption from
the imposition of the death penalty.66 Under theory of punishment
analysis, the relationship of the symptoms, such as a diminished
capacity to control impulses, to the exemption from execution, re-
quires the symptom to have affected the mentally retarded defen-
dant's thought process at the time of his crime.6 1 If he had an ir-
resistible impulse that was the product of mental retardation
(i.e., untreatable with medication or therapy), then the defendant
was not able to conform his conduct.68 Thus, retribution for the
mentally retarded defendant's act is impossible since he is unable
to reflect on the quality of his act. Moreover, a mentally retarded
potential capital murderer can neither engage in logical reason-
ing, nor control his irresistible impulse so that he could mull over
the potential of a death sentence and be deterred from commit-
ting murder.
But this kind of diminished capacity issue was an available mi-
tigating factor during capital sentencing before Atkins was de-
cided 6 and remains available post-Atkins.70 Taking that into ac-
count, under the theory of punishment justification, Atkins may
serve only to guarantee an additional jury instruction explaining
that mental retardation must operate as a super-mitigator and
should not be balanced against other aggravating factors.7' States
have grappled with how to force death-qualified jurors to honor
mental retardation as a super-mitigator; some bifurcate the men-
tal retardation determination from the rest of the classic aggrava-
tor-mitigator sentencing determination, 72 though most merely of-
66. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
67. See id. ("[There is abundant evidence that [the mentally retarded] often act on
impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan. . . .").
68. See Christopher Slobogin, A Defense of the Integrationist Test As a Replacement for
the Special Defense of Insanity, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 523, 524 (2009).
69. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B)(vi) (Repl. Vol. 2000) ("Facts in mitigation may
include. . . mental retardation of the defendant.").
70. See id. § 19.2-264.4(B)(iv) (Cum. Supp. 2010) ("Facts in mitigation may include ...
(iv) at the time of the commission of the capital felony, the capacity of the defendant to ap-
preciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law
was significantly impaired .... ).
71. Cf. Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 38, 44 (2004) (reversing the lower court's instruc-
tions directing "the jury to give effect to mitigation evidence" and acknowledging that the
defendants low IQ score is relevant mitigation evidence that a jury "might well have con-
sidered . . . as a reason to impose a sentence more lenient than death," yet not requiring
the court to exempt the defendant from the death penalty).
72. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 25, at 727.
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fer an additional instruction to jurors,13 which arguably gets lost
in the general aggravator-mitigator balancing act.
2. Trial Prejudice
Atkins has a second, often overlooked, justification for "a cate-
gorical rule making such offenders ineligible for the death penal-
ty."74 The Atkins Court found that mentally retarded defendants
suffered a special risk "'that the death penalty will be imposed in
spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty."'75 The
Court asserted that "[m]entally retarded defendants may be less
able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typi-
cally poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwar-
ranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes."76 If a men-
tally retarded defendant is in fact "less able to give meaningful
assistance to their counsel," then that defendant could be de-
scribed as incompetent to stand trial where a death sentence is a
possibility. That is, the defendant may be competent to stand tri-
al for capital murder, but not competent to stand trial where the
possibility of a death sentence looms.78 In short, mental retarda-
tion may serve as a reason for a narrow finding of incompeten-
cy-the incompetency to stand trial for capital murder where
death is a potential sentence.79 Under this rationale for categori-
73. See Laurie T. Izutsu, Note, Applying Atkins v. Virginia to Capital Defendants with
Severe Mental Illness, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 995, 1004-05 (2005).
74. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002).
75. Id. (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)).
76. Id. at 320-21.
77. Id. at 320.
78. This is a distinction that would be clear to any judge, prosecutor, or defense attor-
ney involved in a capital case, but likely deserves more explanation here. The charge of
capital murder carries two potential sentences-life or death. The crime of capital murder
is distinct from other murders in that it usually involves an additional element of proof
from the government, like the murder of a child or of a police officer. See, e.g., Omar Randi
Ebeid, Comment, Death by Association: Conspiracy Liability and Capital Punishment in
Texas, 45 Hous. L. REV. 1831, 1859 & n.201 (2009) (noting that, in Arizona, determining
whether a crime is punishable by death relies upon a showing of at least one aggravating
factor, such as the murder of a police officer). Under Atkins, a mentally retarded defendant
could proceed to trial for capital murder, but, if guilty, could only be sentenced to life in
prison. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320. Criminal attorneys sometimes refer to this as "taking
death off of the table." For a recent example of a trial judge removing death as a possible
penalty, see Cleve R. Wootson, Jr., No Death Penalty in Police Slayings, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Aug. 25, 2010, http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2010/08/25/1641648/no-death-
penalty-in-police-slayings.html.
79. See Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Physically Present, Yet Mentally Absent, 48 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 313, 317 (2009) (suggesting that if trial courts focus on the cause of
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cally excluding mentally retarded capital defendants from a death
sentence, leaving the job of determining mental retardation to the
death-qualified jury violates due process.8 0
The second justification the Court offers for its categorical rule
exempting mentally retarded defendants from the imposition of
death relates to the trial itself; and in this justification, the Court
has created a new concept. A mentally retarded defendant who
suffers from "diminished capacities to understand and process in-
formation, to communicate, .. . to engage in logical reasoning,...
and to understand the reactions of others" will be less able to give
meaningful assistance to counsel, which will affect the defen-
dant's ability to make a persuasive showing of mitigation, or
serve as an effective witness, because he may be seen as remorse-
less.,' A logical reading of the Court's concern demands that trial
courts add a new determination-that of mental retardation-to
the pretrial competency assessment. If a capital defendant, by
virtue of his mental retardation, lacks the ability to give mea-
ningful assistance to counsel and help prepare a useful, effective
mitigation case, then he should not be subjected to a trial wherein
a death sentence is a possible outcome. The Court acknowledges
the mentally retarded defendant's inability to have a fair trial be-
cause of his own deficiencies8 2 and creates a remedy-exemption
from death." Whether or not a defendant can have a fair trial is a
due process question for the trial court to tackle.
incompetency rather than the result of a finding of incompetency, the entire scheme for
determining competency to stand trial might be transformed).
80. See supra Part 11.1. (detailing the characteristics of death-qualified jurors and the
likelihood that they will disregard evidence of mental retardation or ignore court instruc-
tions that might result in a life sentence).
81. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318, 320-21 (footnote omitted).
82. Id. The Atkins Court seems especially cognizant of the bad impression that a men-
tally retarded defendant might give to the sentencing jury. "[They] are typically poor wit-
nesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for
their crimes." Id. at 321. This concern about the way in which a defendant appears to the
jury seems to cheapen the whole criminal justice process-particularly where death is a
potential sentence-for all defendants, not just those with mental retardation. The thea-
trics of witnesses and lawyers has long been satirized, thus demonstrating the strategic
planning between client and lawyer to manipulate the jury into empathizing with the de-
fendant. See CHITA RIVERA, When Velma Takes the Stand, on CHICAGO: ORIGINAL
SOUNDTRACK (Arista Records 1996) ("When Velma takes the stand/Look at little Vel/See
her give 'em hell/When she turns it on/Ain't she doing grand/She's got 'em eating out of the
palm of her hand" and 'Then, I thought I'd cry. Buckets. Only I don't have a handker-
chief-that's when I have to ask for yours! I really like that part. Don't you?").
83. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
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B. No Due Process Directive from the Court
After declaring that mentally retarded capital defendants are
"categorically less culpable than the average criminal,"84 the
Court in Atkins recognized the difficult task of "developing appro-
priate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction" of excluding
mentally retarded defendants from execution. 5 Rather than ad-
dressing the issue of how to make a determination of mental re-
tardation, the Court returned the question to the states,86 some of
which, in turn, have left the question to the jury.8 As Professors
Carol and Jordan Steiker have written, "by essentially deregulat-
ing the procedural means of enforcing the substantive right, the
Court has undermined the goals of the underlying ban by creat-
ing a substantial risk of false negatives."88 Daryl Atkins himself is
a testament to just how far a death-qualified jury panel will go to
ignore plain evidence and a trial court's directions. 9
Perhaps because the process of determining a juvenile's age
seemed easier than determining mental retardation, the Court
did not address how trial courts should determine the question of
age in Roper, nor did the Court note that states would need to de-
velop a process for determining the age of a capital defendant.90
Historically, the determination of whether a defendant's fate was
to be treated as a juvenile or as an adult has rested with the trial
court.91 The trial court makes the factual determination of wheth-
er a defendant was younger than eighteen years old at the time of
84. Id. at 316; cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005) (employing the same
rationale for exempting mentally retarded capital defendants and juvenile defendants).
85. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416 (1986)).
86. Id. (quoting Ford, 536 U.S. at 416-17).
87. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 25, at 724-25. Given that the Atkins Court ex-
presses concern that jurors will be less persuaded by evidence of mental retardation in
light of the presentation of aggravating factors and that jurors will likely turn the mitigat-
ing factor of mental retardation into an aggravating factor showing future dangerousness,
it is hard to see how any system that allows a jury to weigh mental retardation alongside
other mitigating and aggravating evidence could comport with due process requirements.
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21.
88. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 25, at 725 (noting, specifically, that leaving the
mental retardation determination to death-qualified jurors creates a special risk).
89. The risk of prejudice is most obvious from the fact that some states have created
procedures that mandate that the mental retardation determination must be made by
someone who has not been charged with hearing the substantive evidence of guilt and
making a guilt or innocence decision. See id. at 727; supra Part I.
90. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568, 572-73, 578-79 (2005).
91. See CLEMENS BARTOLLAS & STUART J. MILLER, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA 134
(6th ed. 2008).
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the crime before the commencement of any important proceed-
ings.92 This factual determination of age is jurisdictional in that
this decision necessitates the path and process for each case.93
Based on the outcome of the trial court's factual determination
of age, which is likely undisputed by the parties, the defendant
will find himself either in juvenile court or in adult court.14 In the
Roper context, the age determination could categorically exclude
the defendant from death eligibility.95 Because of this clear histor-
ical process for determining age, the Court gave no instruction in
Roper on how the states should develop appropriate ways to en-
force the constitutional restriction on excluding juveniles from a
death sentence.96
The rationale for excluding mentally retarded defendants and
juvenile defendants from the imposition of a death sentence is the
same.7 Pursuant to the Court's narrowing jurisprudence,98 ex-
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. I have only seen a dispute over age arise in a collateral, postconviction proceed-
ing, usually in the context of a deportation hearing. I have seen two cases where a defen-
dant facing deportation, based on a criminal conviction, filed a corum nobis petition in the
sentencing court asserting that he was actually a juvenile when he was sentenced as an
adult. In both cases, the defendant was Ethiopian, and his birth date had been calculated
according to the Ethiopian calendar, which differs from the Gregorian calendar, used in
the United States. In U.S. years, the defendant was a juvenile at the time of his offense,
though according to the Ethiopian birth date listed on his passport, the defendant ap-
peared to be an adult at the time of the offense. For the simplest explanation of the differ-
ent calendars, see Embassy of Ethiopia, Ethiopian Time, http://www.ethiopianembassy.
org/AboutEthiopia/AboutEthiopia.php?Page=Clock.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2011). Need-
less to say, in each case, a judge heard the complex facts and made a determination of the
defendant's age.
95. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. The under-eighteen defendant would still proceed to trial
for capital murder, but if the jury found him guilty, it could only sentence him to life. See
id. at 559-60. As such, there would be no sentencing phase of the litigation. See supra note
78.
96. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 574.
97. I believe that seriously mentally ill defendants and those with significant brain
injuries could also fall within the rationale that justifies the categorical exemption. There
are compelling arguments that seriously mentally ill capital defendants-whether at the
time of the offense or at the time of execution-should be "categorically exempted." See,
e.g., Robert Batey, Categorical Bars to Execution: Civilizing the Death Penalty, 45 HOus. L.
REV. 1493, 1518-27 (2009) (discussing a categorical bar to executing defendants suffering
from serious mental disease or defect).
98. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) ("There is no principled way to
distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in
which it was not."). Employing special safeguards to ensure that only the most deserving
are put to death originated in Justice Brennan's concurrence in Furman v. Georgia. 408
U.S. 238, 286 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Death is a unique punishment in the
United States."). The creation of and adherence to the "death-is-different" doctrine has
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cluding mentally retarded and juvenile defendants from a death
sentence is appropriate "to ensure that only the most deserving of
execution are put to death."99 The Court has concluded that men-
tally retarded defendants, like juvenile defendants, have a "dimi-
nished ability to understand and process information." " This
theory of deterrence' 0 in capital sentencing simply does not apply
to mentally retarded or juvenile defendants because it is "less
likely that they can process the information of the possibility of
execution as a penalty and, as a result, control their conduct
based upon that information."102 But the Court also recognizes
that the very factors which should be persuasive mitigators to the
jury-diminished capacity based on mental retardation or
youth-will likely be disregarded or even viewed as an aggravat-
ing factor by the sentencing jury.03 Given the similar rationales
for excluding mentally retarded and juvenile defendants from a
done little to remedy inherent problems in capital prosecutions, such as racial bias. See
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 25, at 398-402 (discussing the "death-is-different" doctrine).
99. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002).
100. Id. at 320.
101. The Court has long focused on deterrence and retribution as the dual justifications
for capital punishment. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (noting that "it'is
nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering"' if ex-
ecution does not contribute to retribution or deterrence (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 592 (1977))); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (noting that "retribution
and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders" form the central, social purposes
of the death penalty). The Court has addressed the public safety rationale, in the context
of the jury's charge to assess the defendant's future dangerousness, and has concluded
that the jury must know that the defendant's life sentence would be without the possibility
of parole. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 163-64 (1994).
102. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320. There are compelling arguments that the rationale for not
executing the mentally retarded or juveniles should apply in all criminal trials, i.e., that
death is not different. For a detailed critique of the "two-track system," see Rachel Bar-
kow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and
the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1162, 1186-97, 1205 (2009) ("A uniform
approach under which all criminal defendants get the same substantive sentencing rights
under the Eighth Amendment would put the Court's sentencing jurisprudence back into
the constitutional mainstream.").
103. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21 ('The risk 'that the death penalty will be imposed
in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty,"' is enhanced ... by the lesser
ability of mentally retarded defendants to make a persuasive showing of mitigation in the
face of prosecutorial evidence of one or more aggravating factors . .. [Reliance on mental
retardation as a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelih-
ood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the jury." (quot-
ing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978))); Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 ("An unacceptable
likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would
overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even where the ju-
venile offender's objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should re-
quire a sentence less severe than death. In some cases a defendant's youth may even be
counted against him.").
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death sentence, it follows that trial courts should, procedurally,
treat the two groups the same way.104
C. The Complex Task of Deciding Whether a Defendant is
Mentally Retarded
As it had in Ford v. Wainwright,10 the Court in Atkins left "to
the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce
the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sen-
tences."106 In Ford, the Court held that a capital defendant who
alleges incompetency to be executed is entitled to a competency
evaluation and an evidentiary hearing on the issue; the Court
upheld the longstanding common law rule that execution of the
insane violates the Eighth Amendment.10 By 2007, the Court had
to review and reaffirm its holding in Ford, and step into the due
process breach created by the state of Texas in its attempt to
create a method to comply with the Court's prohibition on the ex-
ecution of those capital defendants who were insane at the time of
the scheduled execution.o8 In the twenty-one years between the
announcement of a new right or protection-that the insane
should not be executed-and an examination of how trial courts
might implement procedures to ensure the new right or protec-
tion,os scholars and lawyers lamented the lack of consistent con-
stitutional criminal procedures to ensure due process.no As they
104. For a complete equal protection argument, see Nita A. Farahany, Cruel and Un-
equal Punishments, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 859, 884-903 (2009) (discussing, in particular,
how mentally retarded defendants are substantially similar to defendants with traumatic
brain injury, central nervous system disorders, and other pervasive developmental disord-
ers). Expanding on Farahany's argument, the mentally retarded, juveniles, and her enu-
merated groups all suffer from the same type of diminished capacity, though each stems
from a different source. Given the Court's reasoning in Atkins and Roper, the source of the
lack of capacity is not the justification for the new narrowing jurisprudence; rather, the
Court focuses on the capital defendant's capacity at the time of the crime and at the time
of the trial and sentencing in "categorically exempting" a new class of people from a death
sentence. See generally Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People with
Mental Illness, 33 N.M. L. REV. 293 (2003); Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court's Evolving
Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV.
785 (2009).
105. 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986).
106. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 416-17).
107. Ford, 477 U.S. at 410-11.
108. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 934-35, 954, 956-57 (2007).
109. Compare Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10 (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
execution of the insane), with Panetti, 551 U.S. at 935 (finding that the trial court failed to
provide adequate procedures).
110. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 22, at 148; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 22.
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did with the prohibition on executing the insane, state legisla-
tures have grappled with myriad procedures to ensure compliance
with the Atkins prohibition on executing the mentally retarded."'
In Atkins, the Court concerned itself with justifying the out-
come, exempting the mentally retarded from execution."2 In 2002,
the Court held that societal standards of decency had evolved to a
place where the execution of a mentally retarded person convicted
of capital murder would violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment."' The majority opi-
nion offers an intense examination of the changes in the way that
state legislatures dealt with the mental retardation issue in capi-
tal trials during the thirteen years between its decision in Penry
v. Lynaugh, where the Court explicitly rejected the defendant's
argument that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution
of the mentally retarded under the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause,14 and its decision in Atkins, which reversed Pe-
nry.n" The majority justifies the outcome with "evolving stan-
dards of decency" jurisprudence and engages in an examination of
state legislatures that enacted statutes to exempt the mentally
retarded from execution between 1989 and 2002.116 In particular,
the majority relies on the direction of the change, exclusively in
favor of protecting the mentally retarded from execution, as "po-
werful evidence that today our society views mentally retarded
111. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 25, at 385 n.147 (citing cases in which the court
has addressed the constitutional adequacy of states' efforts to guide sentencer discretion).
112. See generally Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317-20. I refer to "the mentally retarded defen-
dant" throughout this section. While the Court did not wrestle with the facts to determine
whether Daryl Atkins was mentally retarded or not, the fact that the Court took up the
question and created a new exemption from death for mentally retarded defendants based
on the facts presented about Daryl Atkins makes an inference that the Court found com-
pelling evidence of Daryl Atkins's mental retardation seem appropriate. That the resen-
tencing jury then sentenced Daryl Atkins to death, thereby rejecting his mental retarda-
tion, is the topic of text accompanying notes 9-19, supra.
113. See id. at 321.
114. 492 U.S. 302, 328-29, 335 (1989).
115. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-15.
116. See id. at 304, 313-15. In 1989, at the time of the Penry decision, only two states,
Georgia and Maryland, had statutes that exempted the mentally retarded from execution.
See id. at 313-14 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (Supp. 1988) and MD. CODE ANN.,
Art. 27, § 412(f)(1) (West 1989)). By 2002, Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Flor-
ida, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Caro-
lina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington had joined Georgia, Maryland, and the
federal government in prohibiting execution of the mentally retarded. Id. at 313-15 (dis-
cussing various state statutes exempting mentally retarded defendants from capital pu-
nishment).
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offenders as categorically less culpable than the average crimi-
nal.""
For all of the detailed attention the Court gives to the progress
in the states toward exempting the mentally retarded defendant
from execution, it gives scant attention to defining the condition
of mental retardation."' Without adopting the definition of the
American Association on Mental Retardation, the Court offers, in
a footnote:
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present func-
tioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or
more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication,
self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction,
health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental
retardation manifests before age 18.119
The Court identifies by incorporation the work of scholars who
study mental retardation, characteristics, or symptoms that may
comprise the diagnosis of mental retardation.120 Using the clinical
definition, the Court seems to accept as a threshold that the men-
tally retarded defendant would have "subaverage intellectual
functioning [and] significant limitations in adaptive skills such as
communication, self-care, and self-direction," all of which "became
manifest before the age of eighteen."121 The Court declares that,
"by definition [mentally retarded defendants] have diminished
capacities to understand and process information, to communi-
cate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to en-
gage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand
117. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist made the compelling argu-
ment that capital jurors were not as evolved as state legislators in their standards of de-
cency since, at the time, experts estimated that ten percent of the inmates on death row
were mentally retarded. See id. at 324 n.* (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
118. The Court has a long history of shying away from detail in mental illness cases. In
fact, it often conflates the fundamental principles of competency to stand trial and sanity,
though this might be a remnant of Blackstone's use of "idiot" to designate both those de-
fendants who lack the competency to stand trial and those defendants who lack the capac-
ity to distinguish right from wrong. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410-11
(1986) (discussing the Eighth Amendment prohibition on executing the insane yet assess-
ing whether the defendant is entitled to a competency evaluation); Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715 (1972); see also United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720, 721-22, 725 (6th Cir. 1968);
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24.
119. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3 (quoting AM. AsS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL
RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed. 1992)).
120. Id. at 318 nn.23-24.
121. Id. at 318.
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the reactions of others."122 Among the social and cognitive defi-
ciencies, the Court finds "abundant evidence that they often act
on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and
that in group settings they are followers rather than leaders."2 3
Defendants who satisfy the Atkins definition of mental retarda-
tion are ineligible for the death penalty, whether the degree of
mental retardation is defined as mild, moderate, or severe. 124 The
specific characteristics of mental retardation become important
upon examining the Court's two reasons for exempting the men-
tally retarded from the imposition of the death penalty.125
While the prosecution and the defense might present compet-
ing experts who employ different tests for ascertaining an opinion
on the defendant's mental retardation, the gap in the kind of evi-
dence that should be considered is quite narrow. For example,
witness testimony on how the defendant acted at the time of the
crime is well-accepted evidence to be considered by the jury when
determining whether the defendant was insane at the time of the
offense.126 But evidence of mental retardation should not include
lay testimony about how the defendant acted at the time of the
crime. As Justice Scalia notes in his dissenting opinion in Atkins,
the majority adopted a rule that excludes consideration of moral
responsibility by exempting all mentally retarded defendants-
from mild to severe-from a death sentence.127 Circumstantial
evidence from which a factfinder might ascertain a capital defen-
dant's moral responsibility is, thus, irrelevant to the determina-
tion of mental retardation.
122. Id. (footnote omitted).
123. Id. (footnote omitted).
124. See id. at 321; see also Richard J. Bonnie & Katherine Gustafson, The Challenge of
Implementing Atkins v. Virginia: How Legislatures and Courts Can Promote Accurate As-
sessments and Adjudications of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RICH. L.
REV. 811, 822 (2007) (discussing Justice Scalia's protest against the categorical exclusion
of those with mild mental retardation from capital punishment).
125. Some argue that the factual determination of which defendants should be categor-
ically excluded from execution should not be read narrowly. It seems reasonable that the
trial court should determine which defendants, in the broader sense, satisfy the Atkins
rationale that supports their exclusion from execution. This article, however, concerns it-
self only with those defendants who would meet the narrow criteria of mental retardation.
See, e.g., Corcoran v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495, 502 (Ind. 2002) (Rucker, J., dissenting). The
author, however, agrees with the scholarship in the field that supports the categorical ex-
clusion of other defendants whose execution could not meet the traditional goals of deter-
rence and retribution. See Slobogin, supra note 104, at 293; Winick, supra note 104, at 37.
126. See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299, 303 (7th Cir. 1981).
127. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 339 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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III. A UNIFIED THEORY FOR COMPETENCY ASSESSMENT
Because the Atkins Court expressed a specific concern that
"[m]entally retarded defendants may be less able to give mea-
ningful assistance to their counsel,"128 trial courts should assess
mental retardation during a pretrial competency hearing for the
capital defendant in order to ensure that no Eighth Amendment
violation makes a mockery of the criminal justice system, by un-
dermining "the strength of the procedural protections that our
capital jurisprudence steadfastly guards."129
William Blackstone declared that any man who became mad
after committing a crime and was unable to make a proper plead-
ing in his defense should not be arraigned.o3 0 Dating back as far
as medieval English law, a criminal defendant must be mentally
competent before standing trial.'3 ' Defendants with mental de-
fects were spared from criminal prosecution. 13 2 No conventional
theory of punishment justifies the trial and conviction of a defen-
dant not competent to understand the charges against him, the
nature of the proceedings, or the reasons for his prosecution. 33
There is very little constitutional common law governing the
assessment of competency to stand trial for criminal charges. In
1960, the Supreme Court of the United States set out an explicit
test for determining a defendant's competency to stand trial in
Dusky v. United States.14 The per curiam opinion of less than 250
words sets out the barest of requirements that trial courts must
use to determine if a defendant is competent to stand trial.'1' Per
Dusky, the trial court must ascertain whether the defendant "has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a rea-
sonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him."136 Merely being "oriented to time and place and
128. Id. at 320.
129. Id. at 317.
130. 4 BIACKSTONE, supra note 118, at *24; see also J. Amy Dillard, Without Limita-
tion: "Groundhog Day" for Incompetent Defendants, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1221, 1225 (2007).
131. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at *24.
132. Grant H. Morris et al., Competency to Stand Trial on Trial, 4 HOuS. J. HEALTH L.
& POL'Y 193, 201 (2004).
133. Dillard, supra note 130, at 1225.
134. 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam).
135. Id.
136. Id.
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[having] some recollection of events" is insufficient evidence of
competency. 37 The Court's rational and factual understanding
test, established in Dusky,38 comports with Blackstone's ancient
rule that the prosecution of a defendant so lacking in the present
ability to understand the proceedings and charges against him
cannot satisfy the core values of the criminal justice system.3 1 In
1975, the Court added a fourth consideration for trial courts as-
sessing competency-whether the defendant has the present abil-
ity to assist counsel in preparing a defense.140
As with many of the Court's due process declarations, the me-
thod for conducting a competency evaluation is left to the
states.'4 ' The Court has clarified its jurisprudence minimally, re-
quiring an assessment in every case where the evidence raises
sufficient doubt as to the defendant's competency, though the
Court has declined to specifically define sufficient doubt.142 Ra-
ther, the Court has enumerated a list of factors for each trial
court to consider, including the defendant's irrational behavior
and demeanor in core proceedings, prior medical opinions of a de-
fendant's competency, and concerns raised by defense counsel.14
Much has been written about the "rational understanding"
component of the Dusky competency test.144 Most of that work ad-
dresses the different levels of competency necessary to stand tri-
al, plead guilty, or waive counsel in favor of self-representation,
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at *24.
140. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975).
141. See id. at 173 (discussing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966)).
142. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966); see Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715,
738 (1972) (explaining that incompetent criminal defendants cannot be detained indefi-
nitely when the trial court has determined that there is little hope of restoration to compe-
tency).
143. Drope, 420 U.S. at 180; Pate, 383 U.S. at 385-86.
144. See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond
Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539, 594 (1993) [hereinafter Bonnie, The Compe-
tence of Criminal Defendants]; Richard J. Bonnie et al., Decision-Making in Criminal De-
fense: An Empirical Study of Insanity Pleas and the Impact of Doubted Client Competence,
87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 48, 53 (1996); E. Lea Johnston, Setting the Standard: A Cri-
tique of Bonnie's Competency Standard and the Potential of Problem-Solving Theory for
Self-Representation at Trial, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1605, 1617-18 (2010) (footnote omit-
ted); Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Competence, 'Rational Understanding," and the Crimi-
nal Defendant, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1375, 1376 (2006); Bruce J. Winick, Reforming In-
competency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A Restated Proposal and a Response to
Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 571, 618-19 (1995) (citing Dusky v. Unit-
ed States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)).
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and the theories that support abolition of competency hearings
when it is not in the best interest of the defendant to be relegated
to the mental health system.14 1 It is fair to say that most scholars
focus on the defendant's interest in the competency hearing and
finding, while paying little attention to the societal interest at
stake in the competency determination." 6
The ability to assist counsel in preparing an adequate defense
operates as a lifeline in capital litigation."4 Because of the com-
plexity of all capital litigation, defendants rely on their attorneys
for making critical decisions, and whether consciously or not, at-
torneys engage in surrogate decisionmaking. 148 An often-
overlooked factor in the competency determination is the serious-
ness and complexity of the charges; 1 that is, trial courts cannot
employ a fixed standard for determining competency, but must
rather examine each defendant in the context of his own trial to
see if he is able to assist counsel.15 0 Nowhere is this demand more
pressing than in a capital case. 51
145. See Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants, supra note 144, at 542, 554;
Johnston, supra note 144, at 1610, 1614, 1624; Maroney, supra note 144, at 1380-84; Wi-
nick, supra note 144, at 622. Professor Richard J. Bonnie is responsible for establishing a
cohesive theory for competency for criminal defendants, and much of the scholarship in
the area operates as a response to his seminal work. See Bonnie, The Competence of Crim-
inal Defendants, supra note 144.
146. Professor Bonnie elaborates on the societal interests, such as preserving the moral
dignity of the process by prohibiting the prosecution and conviction of incompetent defen-
dants who neither understand the nature of the wrongdoing nor the punishment thereof.
Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants, supra note 144.
147. See Christopher Seeds, The Afterlife of Ford and Panetti: Execution Competence
and the Capacity to Assist Counsel, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 309, 314, 346-47 (2009) (quoting
Brief for Legal Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22, Panetti v. Quar-
terman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (No. 06-6407)).
148. See Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants, supra note 144, at 546-47.
Surrogate decisionmaking covers only those narrow aspects of the litigation reserved for
the defendant's decision-being tried by a judge or a jury and testifying or remaining si-
lent. Id. This article maintains that, for a capital defendant to assist counsel in the prepa-
ration of an adequate defense, the capital defendant needs to engage in other collaborative
decisionmaking-such as how to present mitigation evidence, how to characterize mental
illness, and the mental retardation determination-in order to have a fair trial that satis-
fies the societal goals of capital punishment.
149. See 7 THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND
INSTRUMENTS 76-77 (1986).
150. Id. at 77.
151. The best evidence of the increased need for expertise and high-level functioning
comes through the states' decisions to require that capital defenders have more experience
and training than other criminal defenders. It follows that if counsel needs to have a more
refined ability to handle the complexity of the capital trial, so too must the capital defen-
dant. See Michael D. Moore, Tinkering with the Machinery of Death: An Examination and
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The Atkins Court ultimately rested its holding on its tradition-
al narrowing jurisprudence-"to ensure that only the most de-
serving of execution are put to death"-and excludes the mentally
retarded from execution.15  But the mere imposition of a death
sentence upon a mentally retarded defendant also constitutes an
Eighth Amendment violation under the Court's second ratio-
nale.15 3 Because of the reduced capacity of the mentally retarded
capital defendant, the Court establishes a "categorical rule mak-
ing such offenders ineligible for the death penalty."154 The Court
worries that, all factors to the contrary, the death-qualified jury
panel will sentence the mentally retarded capital defendant to
death.15 To achieve the goal of ineligible defendants avoiding a
sentence of death, trial courts should assess death-eligibility at
the time of the pretrial competency assessment."16
Even in a pretrial competency assessment, how and whether
trial courts would determine a defendant's mental retardation
would still be a complicated procedure that may be full of conflict-
ing testimony and arguments about what constitutes mental re-
Analysis of State Indigent Defense Systems and Their Application to Death-Eligible Defen-
dants, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1617, 1640 (1996); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice:
Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV.
329, 357-58 (1995).
152. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002).
153. Id. at 321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)). The Atkins
Court held that mentally retarded defendants may lack the ability to assist at trial where
a death sentence is a possibility. Id. at 320-21. Forcing a mentally retarded defendant to
participate in such a trial, both through the guilt or innocence and sentencing phases,
would violate the core principle of Atkins.
154. Id. at 320.
155. Id. at 320-21. It is hard to determine if the Court's concern is sociological or le-
gal-i.e., will the death-qualified jury panel improperly ignore or weigh credible evidence
of mental retardation, or will the death-qualified jury panel simply be unable to empathize
with the mentally retarded defendant and will thus nullify the mental retardation instruc-
tion? In either case, it seems clear that the Court is concerned with the death-qualified
juror's ability to listen to the evidence and make an individualized determination as re-
quired by Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 105 (1982) (requiring "individualized con-
sideration of mitigating factors . . . required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments"
(quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978))).
156. For an example of the risk of mentally retarded defendants being sentenced to
death, one need only reexamine the years of trials and appeals for both Daryl Atkins and
Johnny Paul Penry. See supra notes 10, 19. While the Atkins Court concerns itself with
trial level obstacles for the mentally retarded defendant, the mentally retarded defendant
is even more incapable of assisting counsel during an appellate and postconviction process,
both of which are, arguably, more complex than trial level capital defense. For an excellent
exposition on expanding and reconceptualizing competency determinations to include the
appellate and postconviction process, see Mae C. Quinn, Reconceptualizing Competence:
An Appeal, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 259, 263, 307 (2009).
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tardation.16i But because the Court created a constitutional rule
that turns on a purely clinical diagnosis of mental retardation, 5
it is easy to see the determination as a question of law-the typi-
cal province of the trial judge-rather than as a question of fact.
While scholars have criticized the Court's decision to draw such a
bright-line prohibition against executing any person with a men-
tal retardation diagnosis,"' the question is clearly not one to be
mixed with demeanor facts, as the insanity determination is.160
IV. HEIGHTENED RELIABILITY: ACHIEVING DUE PROCESS IN THE
MENTAL RETARDATION DETERMINATION
Today's decision is the pinnacle of our Eighth Amendment death-is-
different jurisprudence. Not only does it, like all of that jurispru-
dence, find no support in text or history of the Eighth Amendment; it
does not even have support in current social attitudes regarding the
conditions that render an otherwise just death penalty inappro-
priate.'
157. See, e.g., John H. Blume et al., Of Atkins and Men: Deviations From Clinical Defi-
nitions of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 689,
695-97 (2009) (discussing the difficulty courts have in adhering to standard requirements
of the various definitions of mental retardation). Like determining competency to stand
trial more generally, trial courts would have the task of assessing complex medical testi-
mony. See Davoli, supra note 79, at 345-46. As there is a push among academics to per-
suade trial courts to use a broader, more medically appropriate method for assessing com-
petency, see, for example, id. at 321, 330, so too is there a push for trial courts to employ a
broader, more meaningful interpretation of "mental retardation," such as creating a cate-
gorical exemption from a death sentence. See Batey, supra note 97, at 1519; Farahany,
supra note 104, at 903-04.
158. See Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 124, at 813.
159. See id. at 814. Professor Bonnie is the dominant critic of employing a "statistical
construct" as a categorical bar to execution. See id. This critique makes sense to any crim-
inal law scholar, since issues of mental health are routinely examined in the context of the
defendant's capacity to form mens rea. See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987).
Placing the mental retardation determination with the rest of the competency assessment
in the capital case should settle this discomfort with the "statistical construct." In Atkins,
arguably, the Court purposefully chose to exempt mentally retarded defendants-and not
others who suffer mental illness or impairment that make them less culpable-from death
because, like being a juvenile, the clinical determination of mental retardation is fairly
simple; hence, the Court adopted the clinical definition of mental retardation. See Atkins,
536 U.S. at 318. But in adopting a clear method, the Court escaped the "mild, moderate,
and severe" argument offered by Justice Scalia, and presumably, did not want jurors to
agree with Justice Scalia that mild mental retardation does not impair a defendant suffi-
ciently to exempt him from a death sentence. Id. at 338-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia's
mere recitation of the facts makes his point that, in his mind, the facts should matter and
no one should be categorically excluded from death. See id. at 338.
160. See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 745, 749-53 (2005) (demonstrating the
Court's acceptance of Arizona's use of demeanor facts to determine insanity).
161. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 337-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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In the opening lines of his dissenting opinion in Atkins, Justice
Scalia condemns the "evolving standards of decency"162 rationale
supporting the majority's declaration that the execution of men-
tally retarded defendants would abridge the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment."6' Original-
ists have voiced complaints over "evolving standards of decency"
as a justification for the living Constitution for decades.1" But
even as Scalia rebukes the majority's Eighth Amendment juri-
sprudence, he obliquely embraces centuries of criminal law juri-
sprudence that could likewise justify a procedure that could
heighten reliability in the trial court's mental retardation deter-
mination and spare mentally retarded defendants from receiving
a death sentence. 165
The Eighth Amendment is the driving force in the capital juri-
sprudence developed by appellate and postconviction courts,
which examine the capital defendant's claims after he has been
found guilty and sentenced to death. Appellate and postconviction
courts review the substantive fairness of a death sentence pur-
suant to the Eighth Amendment.166 Due Process Clause review,
where the court focuses on the procedure used by the trial court
to protect the capital defendant's substantive rights,'6 7 such as the
162. Id. at 341-42 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
163. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
164. It is easy to categorize that originalists prefer historical due process over evolving
standards of decency but the two are not mutually exclusive. When the Court applied
evolving standards of decency in the death context, it did not explicitly reject historical
due process, but critics could argue that the net result may well have become an over-
reliance on evolving standards of decency to limit the number of defendants who receive a
death sentence. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 607-08 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976); Steven G. Calabresi,
The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent, and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635,
667-68 (2006).
165. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 340-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 431-32 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) ('This Court has ruled that punishment is excessive and unconstitutional if it is 'noth-
ing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,' or if it is
'grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.' It has held that death is an exces-
sive punishment for rape, and for mere participation in a robbery during which a killing
takes place." (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977))); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 797 (1982); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
167. Whether a mentally retarded capital defendant has a substantive due process
right to be free from receiving a death sentence is the subject of the author's work-in-
progress. An exceedingly oversimplified approach to the inquiry requires a determination
of whether the Eighth Amendment violation of sentencing a mentally retarded defendant
to death can be remedied by appellate review. In that article, the author maintains that,
when a mentally retarded defendant or a juvenile receives a death sentence, a substantive
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right of mentally retarded defendants to be categorically ex-
empted from death, is rare. 16 But due process review, in the ha-
beas or appellate context, will always have flaws.'69 On appellate
or habeas review, the defendant stands convicted and sentenced
to death, and in the Atkins context, presumed to be free from
mental retardation that would categorically exempt him from a
death sentence.170
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Atkins offers an overview
of the treatment of mentally retarded defendants, known as
"idiots" at the time of the drafting of the Eighth Amendment.'7 In
1791, "'idiots' enjoyed ... special status under the law at that
time. They, like lunatics, suffered a 'deficiency in will' rendering
them unable to tell right from wrong."172 Justice Scalia's primary
objection to the majority opinion in Atkins is that the "idiots" of
yesterday would be only the severely or profoundly mentally re-
tarded today.17 He objects to the "evolving standards of decency,"
which would give mildly mentally retarded defendants the same
''special status under the law" enjoyed historically by only the
most severely mentally retarded defendants. 7 4 But his history
lesson offers a glimpse at historical due process employed by
due process violation has occurred. Moreover, the work-in-progress asserts that, under the
Court's second rationale in Atkins, forcing a mentally retarded defendant to participate in
a capital trial where death is a potential sentence constitutes a substantive due process
violation. For general overview of the debate over substantive and procedural due process
claims, see, for example, Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due
Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833 (2003).
168. Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 16 (discussing the dominance of Eighth Amend-
ment analysis and the Court's "flirting" with the due process jurisprudence); see also
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977) (finding that a death sentence based on secret
evidence violates due process).
169. A good example of the debate over the flaws in the process employed during appel-
late and habeas review appears in the statement of Justice Stevens in the denial of the
petition of certiorari in Walker v. Georgia, 555 U.S. _, _, 129 S. Ct. 453, 457 (2008)
("And the likely result of such a truncated [proportionality] review ... is the arbitrary or
discriminatory imposition of death sentences in contravention of the Eighth Amend-
ment."). If we know that appellate and habeas review will likely be "truncated," then need
for trial procedures that guarantee due process becomes increasingly important.
170. See Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 17. ("[The Supreme Court's Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, consistent with the federal courts' exclusively post hoc perspective in
the post-Furman era, looks primarily to the substantive merits of the punishment and not
to its procedural regularity.").
171. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 340 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172. Id. (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at *24).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 340-41.
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courts to sort the "idiots" who should be spared from death from
those who were fit to be executed."'
This section accepts the majority view in Atkins that mentally
retarded defendants-whether mild or severe-should be categor-
ically exempted from execution,"' and it looks to Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion and to legal history to see how courts have ac-
complished categorical exemption in the past by tracing the de-
velopment, use, and evolution of in favorem vitae, a doctrine
meaning "in favor of life."17 The doctrine in its original form de-
manded rigid adherence to technical formalities and strict statu-
tory interpretation in capital cases."'7  This section will explore
how the doctrine offers a glimpse at historical due process
through the heightened use of judicial discretion where death was
a possible penalty."17 In the most obvious sense, in favorem vitae
might be seen as an argument for a presumption of life, though
the Court has never accepted that argument in the capital con-
text. 80
175. Id. at 340 ("Due to their incompetence, idiots were 'excuse[d] from the guilt, and of
course from the punishment, of any criminal action committed under such deprivation of
the senses.' Instead, they were often committed to civil confinement or made wards of the
State, thereby preventing them from go[ing] loose, to the terror of the king's subjects."
(quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at *25, and citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302, 331 (1989))); SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 11-
14 (3d ed. 1985); 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, supra note 35, at 33.
176. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-21 (majority opinion).
177. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 35, at 847; see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 339-
54 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 15, 17-19.
178. Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 17.
179. The Court has long espoused the need for "heightened reliability" in capital trials,
both at the guilt or innocence and sentencing phases. Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 342
(1993) ("[The Eighth Amendment requires a greater degree of accuracy and factfinding
than would be true in a noncapital case."); see also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 455
(1984) (discussing the reliability the Court demands in capital cases); Thurschwell, supra
note 23, at 15.
180. See Beth S. Brinkmann, Note, The Presumption of Life: A Starting Point for a Due
Process Analysis of Capital Sentencing, 94 YALE L.J. 351, 360-64 (1984). The Court has
never confronted whether trial courts should adopt a "presumption of life" approach when
making the mental retardation determination. The argument for a presumption of life in
capital litigation began with the publication of Beth S. Brinkmann's note in the Yale Law
Journal in 1984. While state sentencing schemes that reflect a presumption of death are
unconstitutional, the Court has imposed no requirement that states employ sentencing
schemes that require a presumption of life. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173-81
(2006). Courts have determined that defendants are entitled to jury determination of fac-
tors that will increase punishment, whether in terms of years or a death sentence. See
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 477 (2000).
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This section maintains that trial courts should ensure due
process at the mental retardation determination in all capital
murder prosecutions. Through an examination of how trial courts
have historically protected the core values of the criminal justice
system,'"' this section extends a modern application of the in fa-
vorem vitae doctrine 8 2 as it could be used by trial courts in capital
cases to ensure fair application of the Atkins protections for men-
tally retarded defendants.
A. The Origin of In Favorem Vitae
Death, it turns out, has always been "different," even before the
Founding-not as a matter of the Eighth Amendment's post hoc con-
cern with the justice of the ultimate punishment imposed, but as a
matter of the due process concern with the justice of the procedures
afforded to a defendant who might suffer the ultimate punishment at
the hands of the state.1 8 3
Although many capital defendants were convicted in eighteenth-
century England,184 scholars estimate that in reality only approx-
imately half of the convicts were executed. 8 5 This phenomenon
can be credited to a combination of pardons by the crown, 86 and
more pertinent here, the use of in favorem vitae by judges. 8 1
When confronted with capital statutes that expressly removed
181. One modern expression of a core value of the criminal justice system is the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII. Another core value, post-Atkins, is that mentally retarded defendants are categori-
cally exempted from death. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. _, , 128 S. Ct. 2641,
2650-51 (2008).
182. Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 15 ("Death, it turns out, has always been 'differ-
ent,' even before the Founding-not as a matter of the Eighth Amendment's post hoc con-
cern with the justice of the ultimate punishment imposed, but as a matter of due process
concern with the justice of the procedures afforded to a defendant who might suffer the
ultimate punishment at the hands of the state."). For a discussion of in favorem vitae, see
supra note 35.
183. Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 15.
184. See John H. Langbein, Albion's Fatal Flaws, 98 PAST & PRESENT 96, 110 (1983)
(stating that 1121 people were convicted and sentenced to death between 1749-1771).
185. See id. at 110 (accounting that from 1749-1771, out of the 1121 convicts sentenced
to death, 443 convicts were reprieved or died in prison, and of the 443 who were reprieved,
401 were pardoned for transportation); see also LEON RADZINOWICZ, THE MOVEMENT FOR
REFORM 157-58 (1948) (estimating that from 1710-1714, only 35 percent of those capitally
convicted in London were actually executed).
186. Langbein, supra note 184, at 110 (stating that 401 of the 443 who escaped execu-
tion were pardoned).
187. See id. at 110-13 (discussing the factors considered before executing a convict).
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the benefit of the clergy, 8 judges applying the in favorem vitae
doctrine would construe indictments, pleadings, statutes, and
procedural rules "literally and strictly" in order to avoid imposing
the statutorily required death sentence.8 9
English common law reserved capital punishment for a few
crimes-treason, murder, rape, and arson.190 From the Middle
Ages to the eighteenth century, defendants facing capital pu-
nishment could invoke the privilegii clericalis, "the benefit of the
clergy."19, Originally, only actual members of the clergy could
claim the privilege, which entitled clerics to have their cases re-
moved from the jurisdiction of common law courts to ecclesiastical
courts.'92 By the fourteenth century, literate non-clerics could also
claim the privilege.193 By the fifteenth century, the privilege had
evolved so that defendants could only claim it postconviction.19 4
Beginning in the sixteenth century, Parliament attempted to
curb the use of the privilege by requiring defendants who had in-
voked it to have their thumbs branded.9 5 For capital defendants
who could claim clergy, a death sentence was commuted to a
seven-year term of indentured servitude in the British colonies.196
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, not alone in his disapproval of the
clergy privilege, critically referred to it as "a promiscuous but ab-
surd and capricious mitigation of the cruel severity of the com-
mon law."97 Thus, by the eighteenth century, Parliament widely
188. In privilegii clericalis began as an ecclesiastical privilege that exempted members
of the clergy from criminal trial in secular courts, but it evolved into a jurisprudence in
secular court of offering leniency, first for clergymen, and later for the literate. See J.H.
BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 513-15 (4th ed. 2002). By the six-
teenth century, it had become a doctrine of leniency for first-time offenders. See 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at *358-67.
189. Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 17.
190. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 185, at 4.
191. Id. at 3 & n.2.
192. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at *358, *361.
193. SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 35 (2d ed. 1890).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 36. "Under Edward VI clergy was taken from murder, burglary, house-
breaking, and putting the inhabitants in fear, highway robbery, horse-stealing, and rob-
bing churches. Under Elizabeth, stealing from the person, amounting to grand larceny,
and rape and burglary in 1576, were excluded from clergy." Id. (citations omitted).
196. Langbein, supra note 184, at 117.
197. STEPHEN, supra note 193, at 35. For a discussion of the history and evolution of
the benefit of the clergy, see supra note 188.
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enacted statutes restricting the use of the privilege to a few li-
mited crimes. 98
In England, between 1688 and 1823, the number of capital
crimes grew four-fold.199 In favorem vitae grew increasingly popu-
lar as the clergy privilege waned in use.200 As early as the seven-
teenth century, Sir Matthew Hale noted that "where any sta-
tute . . . hath ousted clergy in any of those felonies, it is only so
far ousted, and only in such cases and as to such persons as are
expressly comprised within such statutes, for in favorem vitae &
privilegii clericalis such statutes are construed literally and
strictly."201 Strict interpretation of statutes required judges, when
confronted with ambiguous statutes, to resolve the ambiguity in
favor of the accused.2 02
Essentially, in favorem vitae demanded that capital statutes be
applied with a rigid, technical conformity to pleading and proof,
resulting in a disparity between the laws as written and as ap-
plied. 203 Radzinowicz noted that even though the number of capi-
tal offenses was "large and growing," the number of executions
rapidly declined, and attributed this discrepancy to the "diver-
gence between the policy of the Legislature, which was to main-
tain and even to increase the number of capital statutes, and the
attitude of those who were called upon to put the law into opera-
tion."204
In favorem vitae reached its heyday in eighteenth-century Eng-
land, which bore witness to the exponential growth in capital sta-
198. BAKER, supra note 188, at 515 & n.82; RADZINOWICZ, supra note 185, at 3 & n.2;
Phillip M. Spector, The Sentencing Rule of Lenity, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 511, 517 & n.40
(2002) (discussing how statutes retracting benefit of clergy were essentially death penal-
ties).
199. See RADzINowIcz, supra note 185, at 611-59 (offering a complete list of eighteenth
century capital statutes in England).
200. See 2 HALE, supra note 35, at 335; see also 2 WILLIAM HAWIGNS, A TREATISE OF
THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 188 (8th ed. 1824) (agreeing that the "settled rule [is] that all
statutes are to be construed strictly in favour of life").
201. 2 HALE, supra note 35, at 335.
202. See Livingston Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HARV. L.
REv. 748, 751-52, 756-61 (1935) (discussing the history of strict interpretation of statutes
and advocating its death); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construc-
tion of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 189 (1985) (proposing that the rule of strict con-
struction is "defunct").
203. See RADZINOWICZ, supra note 185, at 158.
204. Id.
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tutes that prohibited the clergy privilege.205 In his Commentaries,
published in the 1760s, Blackstone tallied the number of capital
statutes at 160.206 While some of these capital statutes punished
serious crimes like murder, piracy, and arson, most imposed
death for property crimes, which today would be considered mi-
nor, such as grand larceny (defined at the time as the theft of
goods over twelve pence), burglary, bankruptcy, forgery, and em-
bezzlement.207 It was into this atmosphere of severe punishments
for petty crimes that the concept of in favorem vitae was widely
invoked. 20 8
While conceding that English judges resorted to stringent re-
quirements and strained interpretations out of necessity and
from mercy, scholars nonetheless criticized the use of in favorem
vitae.20 9 Radzinowicz disapproved of the practice, commenting
that "[w]hen in a case tried under a capital statute the court felt
that it would be unjust to inflict the appointed penalty, it applied
any technique by which it could be evaded. "210 Hale, while ac-
knowledging "[t]he strictness required in indictments is great, be-
cause life is in question,"21 disparaged the use of in favorem vitae
205. Id. at 4; 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at *18.
206. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at *18 ('It is a melancholy truth, that among the
variety of actions which men are daily liable to commit, no less than an hundred and sixty
have been declared by act of parliament to be felonies without benefit of clergy; or, in other
words, to be worthy of instant death.").
207. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 185, at 620-59. The overwhelming majority of offenders
were executed for having committed property crimes.
Out of 678 offenders executed in London and Middlesex in the twenty-three
years from 1749 to 1771, seventy-two had committed murder, fifteen at-
tempted murder, two rape, two sodomy, one high treason, and two other felo-
nies. Thus out of 678 capital sentences for which executions took place, only
ninety-four were for very serious crimes against the person and the State; all
the remaining 584 were for offences against property.
Id. at 148.
208. See HAWKINS, supra note 200, at 188.
209. See Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 17.
The consensus view among scholars is that the hypertechnicality of the Eng-
lish courts' interpretations, although purporting to adhere strictly to the
laws, in fact masked an instrumentalist approach that-while understanda-
ble from the perspective of the moral merits of the cases (which often involved
petty theft crimes)-ill-served the greater cause of the rule of law.
Id.
210. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 185, at 87.
211. 2 HALE, supra note 35, at 168.
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as "a blemish and inconvenience in the law, and the administra-
tion thereof; more offenders escape by the over easy ear given to
exceptions in indictments, than by their own innocence."22
B. Capital Punishment in the American Colonies and in
Nineteenth Century America
While American colonists imposed the death penalty to a lesser
extent than their English contemporaries, 213 capital punishment
has existed in the United States since the country's inception.214
Initially, Northern colonists did not punish property crimes like
burglary and robbery with death, but they did impose the death
penalty for morality offenses, such as blasphemy, adultery, and
bestiality.215 Because of their dependence on agriculture, Southern
colonists imposed death for minor property crimes, such as em-
bezzling tobacco and stealing livestock.216
While the number of capital statutes in the United States in-
creased in the eighteenth century,217 it never came close to top-
ping the number of English capital statutes. 218 Because not as
many crimes were punishable by death, the American judiciary
did not have as much occasion to employ in favorem vitae. Never-
theless, the concept was firmly recognized and has been applied
since the country's founding. 219
Capital cases from the early nineteenth century remained
faithful to English procedural rules and judges construed rules
narrowly and in favor of the defendant. 220 That capital defendants
212. Id. at 193.
213. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 6-7 (2002).
214. See id. at 5-9.
215. See id. at 6.
216. See id. at 8.
217. See id. at 7-8.
218. See id. at 7.
219. Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 14-15. The doctrine was first invoked in State v.
Briggs, decided in 1794, where the Constitutional Court of Appeals of South Carolina re-
jected a horse thief's in favorem vitae argument that he was entitled to an extra day to
prepare for trial. 3 S.C.L. 8, 1 Brev. *8 (S.C. Eq. 1794), overruled by State v. Torrence, 406
S.E.2d 315, 324, 328 n.5 (S.C. 1991). At the time, horse-stealing was punishable by death.
BANNER, supra note 213, at 140.
220. See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 633-34 (1818) (noting that
the defendants had been indicted for the capital crime of piracy, and interpreting the anti-
piracy statute to protect only crimes against U.S. citizens, resulting in a sentence other
than death); United States v. Venable, 28 F. Cas. 368, 368 (C.C.D.C. 1807) (No. 16,615)
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received special treatment was deeply ingrained in the minds of
early American jurists. In United States v. Wood, where a defen-
dant faced both capital and noncapital charges for armed robbery
of the mail, the prosecutor admitted that "whether the [capital]
counts were proved would depend upon the meaning [of] the word
'jeopardy,"' and noted that since "[t]he word is doubtful and the
case is capital" he would not "press that part of the case which
calls for the offender's life."22 1
American judges often exercised their discretion in favorem vi-
tae to afford capital defendants special consideration, such as se-
vering joint indictments2 m2 and granting a new trial because the
original judge died right before he was about to deliver his opi-
nion on a murder convict's motion for a new trial. 223 Of course,
capital defendants did not always receive preferential treatment.
For example, in United States v. Perez, without obtaining the cap-
ital defendant's consent, the court discharged the jury because it
failed to agree on a verdict.22 4 The Supreme Court of the United
States held that judges have the discretion to declare mistrials;
thus, discharging the jury without the defendant's consent would
not bar a future trial. 2 5 Writing for the Court, Justice Story
stated, "To be sure, the power ought to be used with the greatest
caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and ob-
vious causes; and, in capital cases especially, Courts should be ex-
tremely careful how they interfere with any of the chances of life,
in favour of the prisoner."226
(instructing the jury to apply a statute narrowly, which resulted in the acquittal of a de-
fendant.who had been indicted for the capital crime of passing counterfeited coin).
221. 28 F. Cas. 755, 759 (C.C.D. Pa. 1818) (No. 16,757). Despite the prosecutor's con-
cession, the trial judge instructed the jury to adopt the broader definition of "jeopardy" and
the jury ultimately found the defendant guilty of the capital offense. Id. at 759-60. The
appellate court, however, arrested the judgment because the indictment had not alleged
that the trial court had jurisdiction, and as the case was capital, it should have been tried
where the offense had been committed. Id. at 761.
222. See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 26 F. Cas. 1205, 1206 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1846)
(No. 15,746).
223. See, e.g., United States v. Harding, 26 F. Cas. 131, 133, 136 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1846)
(No. 15,301).
224. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 579 (1824).
225. Id. at 579-80.
226. Id. at 580. Justice Story may be the most prolific jurist on the in favorem vitae
doctrine. While he criticized "its excesses," he also maintained that "capital defendants
deserved special procedural considerations 'in favor of life' in appropriate cases-
particularly with respect to discretionary issues and close interpretations of statutes."
Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 18, 22 nn.43-44 (setting out a detailed history of Justice
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Early on, American judges recognized that the evidence re-
quired to convict a capital defendant must be strong.227 Trial
courts often articulated the burden of proof in criminal cases-
beyond a reasonable doubt-in terms of the in favorem vitae doc-
trine.228 When confronted with the issues of peremptory chal-
lenges, motions for separate trials, and motions for new trial,
while judges did not always grant capital defendants' request,
they often invoked in favorem vitae to justify their decisions.229
C. In Favorem Vitae in Twentieth Century America
American courts in the twentieth century continued to depart
from English rules of procedure. By the twentieth century, in fa-
vorem vitae had evolved into a catch-all phrase for exercising
judicial discretion in favor of capital defendants. 230 Some courts
independently searched trial records for unpreserved error 23
Story's in favorem vitae opinions). His language was often full of compassion: "In a capital
cause, every motive of humanity and justice, combining with the precepts of the law,
would compel me to postpone a decision until all such doubts were dissipated. I never will
be instrumental in taking away life, until I am clearly persuaded that the law imposes
upon me this painful and melancholy duty." United States v. Cornell, 25 F. Cas. 650, 652
(C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 14,868).
227. See, e.g., United States v. Vanranst, 28 F. Cas. 360, 360 (C.C.D. Pa. 1812) (No.
16,608) ("In any case, more particularly in one that is capital, the circumstances relied
upon to establish the guilt of the accused, ought to be strong, so as to leave no doubt of the
fact; and they should be consistent with themselves, each circumstance tending to estab-
lish the guilt of the party.").
228. See, e.g., Neal v. Fesperman, 46 N.C. (1 Jones) 416, 417 (1854) ("Where the evi-
dence is circumstantial it is admitted to be proper, 'in favorem vitae,' for the Court to in-
struct the jury that if there be any hypothesis consistent with the prisoner's innocence
they should find for him 'not guilty'-that is, if the circumstances proven may all be true,
and still the prisoner be not guilty, they should acquit."); State v. Bartlett, 43 N.H. 224,
230 (1861), overruled by Novosel v. Helgemoe, 384 A.2d 124, 131 (N.H. 1978) ("A system of
rules, therefore, by which the burden is shifted upon the accused of showing any of the
substantial allegations in the indictment to be untrue, or, in other words, to prove a nega-
tive, is purely artificial and formal, and utterly at war with the humane principle which,
in favorem vitae, requires the guilt of the prisoner to be established beyond reasonable
doubt.").
229. See, e.g., United States v. White, 28 F. Cas. 580, 580, 584 (C.C.D. Mass. 1826) (No.
16,682). Where two defendants had been indicted for murder on the high seas and one de-
fendant moved for separate trials, the court overruled the defendant's motion, reasoning,
"[i]n capital cases it is always the desire of the court to grant every reasonable favor to the
prisoners; but it is, at the same time, its duty to allow the government its fair and regular
claims." Id. at 580.
230. See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., State v. Young, 51 A. 939, 941 (N.J. 1902) ("We have deemed it proper, in
favorem vitae, to assume, without deciding, that under the present legislation an excep-
tion duly taken to the admission of a confession in evidence may raise the question wheth-
er the conclusions of fact whereon the trial court acted were justified by the evidence taken
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while other courts continued to recognize that capital defendants
deserved special procedural accommodations.232 In Andres v. Unit-
ed States, the trial judge issued ambiguous jury instructions re-
garding the mitigation of a defendant's death sentence to life im-
prisonment.23 3 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed
and remanded a lower court's death sentence, stating, "In death
cases doubts such as those presented here should be resolved in
favor of the accused."234
Modern application of in favorem vitae is best exemplified by
the approach of the South Carolina judiciary, which afforded cap-
ital defendants heightened appellate review. 23 5 In favorem vitae
thus became synonymous with an appellate court's independent
review of the record in death penalty cases to search for legal er-
rors not properly preserved.236 In State v. Swilling, the court
stated, "In keeping with ... in favorem vitae, we have not only
considered the exceptions on appeal and the questions briefed
and orally argued. . . , but we have also independently searched
the record for prejudicial error, whether or not objected to below
or made a ground of exception here."23 7 South Carolina abrogated
its use of in favorem vitae in State v. Torrence, where it accepted
the state's argument that "historical and legal developments have
rendered in favorem vitae obsolete." 238
in the preliminary examination in that court.").
232. See, e.g., Sanford v. Robbins, 115 F.2d 435, 439 (5th Cir. 1940) (presuming, in fa-
vorem vitae, that the defendant must have consented to a new trial since he had been
"condemned to death and might be helped and could not possibly be hurt by a new trial
233. 163 F.2d 468, 469 (9th Cir. 1947), rev'd, 333 U.S. 740 (1948).
234. Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 752 (1948).
235. See John H. Blume & Pamela A. Wilkins, Death by Default: State Procedural De-
fault Doctrine in Capital Cases, 50 S.C. L. REV. 1, 11-16 (1998) (discussing the history of
in favorem vitae review in South Carolina and its abolition).
236. See State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315, 319 (S.C. 1991).
237. 142 S.E.2d 864, 865 (S.C. 1965), overruled by Torrence, 406 S.E.2d at 328 & n.5.
238. 406 S.E.2d at 319. Justice Chandler argued that since other mechanisms afforded
protection and postconviction relief to those capitally convicted, in favorem vitae review
was no longer necessary to safeguard capital defendants. Id. at 321-23 (Chandler, J., con-
curring).
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D. An In Favorem Vitae Hearing to Determine Mental
Retardation Before the Capital Trial Begins
Since 1354, English law has recognized that individuals sen-
tenced to death must be afforded due process of the law.13' The
framers of the Bill of Rights incorporated the same principle into
the Fifth Amendment, which states that "[n]o person shall be
held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ... nor be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . ."240
The bulk of contemporary capital punishment jurisprudence is
centered on the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Pu-
nishments Clause.241 However, scholars have argued that the
Court should use the Due Process Clause to establish "minimal
procedures that should underlie all capital sentencing proceed-
ings,"242 reasoning that the Due Process Clause better ensures re-
liability in capital sentencing than the Cruel and Unusual Pu-
nishments Clause.243 While federal courts rarely invoke the Due
Process Clause when discussing capital punishment, they have
done so on several occasions. 2 44 The Supreme Court has held that
due process requires that those on trial for their lives be provided
239. See John Baker, Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Renaissance England, 2
Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 1, 11 & n.57 (2004) ("Item qe nul homme, de quel estate ou condi-
tion qil soit, ne soit oste de terre ne de tenement, ne pris, nemprisone, ne disherite, ne mis
a mort, saunz estre mesne en respons par due proces de lei," which may be translated
thus: "No Man, of whatever estate or condition, shall be put out from land or tenement,
taken or imprisoned, disinherited, or put to death, without being brought to answer by due
process of the law." (citing 28 Edward III, c.3)).
240. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
241. See Brinkmann, supra note 180, at 360-62; see also Thurschwell, supra note 23, at
16.
242. Brinkmann, supra note 180, at 352.
243. See id. at 367, 370, 373 (arguing that the Due Process Clause requires courts to
presume a defendant facing capital punishment deserves a life sentence to ensure that
death is not imposed in violation of the Constitution and to place the burden on the prose-
cution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the only appropriate penalty);
Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 16-17; Joshua Herman, Comment, Death Denies Due
Process: Evaluating Due Process Challenges to the Federal Death Penalty Act, 53 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1777, 1777-78 (2004) (discussing United States v. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d 416
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), reu'd, 313 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2002), and United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp.
2d 469 (D. Vt. 2002), rev'd, 360 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2004), which challenged the constitutio-
nality of the Federal Death Penalty Act using due process arguments).
244. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 158, 162, 168-73 (1975); Powell v. Ala-
bama, 287 U.S. 45, 65 (1932).
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with the aid of counsel when desired.245 The Court has vacated a
death sentence, holding that a trial judge violated due process
when, in deciding whether to impose the death sentence, he relied
on a confidential presentence investigation report, portions of
which were not disclosed to either the defendant or his counsel,
such that the defendant had no opportunity to deny or explain its
contents. 246 The Court has reversed a death sentence conviction,
holding that while evidence in the record indicated that aggravat-
ing circumstances existed to justify a death sentence, the jury had
not reached the same conclusion, and therefore the trial court vi-
olated the defendant's due process rights by imposing a death
sentence.247 The Court reversed a capital conviction, reasoning
that the trial court's exclusion of hearsay testimony during the
punishment phase of the trial violated due process because that
testimony was "highly relevant to a critical issue ... and substan-
tial reasons existed to assume its reliability."248
In recent cases, the Court has demonstrated willingness to look
at the constitutionality of due process issues based on how Eng-
lish common law treated the issues. 249 Looking to common law at
the time of the founding reveals that those who could not under-
stand the fundamentals of trial were not forced to participate in
trials where they might receive a death sentence. 250 Blackstone
commented, "[I]f a man in his sound memory commits a capital
offence, ... [a]nd if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes
mad, he shall not be tried; for how can he make his defence?"251
The decision of whether a man is competent to stand trial is one
for the court, since the very act of putting an incompetent defen-
dant before jurors contradicts the core values of the criminal jus-
245. Powell, 287 U.S. at 68, 72-73. In establishing the right to counsel in a capital case,
the Court in Powell surveyed legal history and pointed to the right to counsel in capital
cases in the colonial legislatures. Id. at 61-63, 65, 68. As Adam Thurschwell has argued,
"the First Congress provided for appointment of counsel for capital defendants in the same
act that authorized capital punishment, making no similar provision for non-capital de-
fendants for almost another century." Thurschwell, supra note 23, at 14 n.3 (citing Mal-
lard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 306 (1989)).
246. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 351 (1977).
247. Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 15-17 (1978).
248. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 96-97 (1979) (citations omitted).
249. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 479-81 (2000); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.
639 (1990); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 356-60 (1996); Thurschwell, supra
note 23, at 15-17.
250. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at *24; see also Thurschwell, supra note 23, at
17.
251. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 118, at *1440-42.
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tice system. The fundamental protection of the right to due
process is a determination that being made to stand trial is fair.
A mentally retarded defendant who is susceptible to trial prob-
lems, such as an inability to assist counsel or serve as a useful
witness for the defense, as well as to sentencing problems, such
as a jury's disregard for mental retardation as a mitigating factor,
is incapable of participating in a fair trial.2 52
Before the trial begins, the trial court owes each capital defen-
dant a determination of the mental retardation issue, and em-
ploying the in favorem vitae doctrine would ensure that due
process is not offended. Moreover, this call for a unified compe-
tency assessment, reviewed in favorem vitae, is consistent with
the Court's trend to exempt those defendants who are incompe-
tent to be executed from the death-eligible trial.253
V. THE TWO-EDGED SWORD OF MENTAL RETARDATION
The Supreme Court's decision to categorically exclude mentally
retarded defendants from the imposition of a death sentence
marked a shift from its earlier jurisprudence whereby mental re-
tardation was a mitigating factor to be considered by the jury at
sentencing.2 54 The Court recognized that "mental retardation as a
mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the
likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness
will be found by the jury."25 5 Because categorical exclusion is the
Court's mandate in Atkins, the mentally retarded defendant de-
serves protection from "the two-edged sword."256 By creating a
new constitutional right-the Eighth Amendment right for men-
tally retarded defendants to be categorically excluded from the
imposition of a death sentence-the Court necessitates imple-
mentation of a procedure that will guarantee due process to pro-
tect the defendant's Eighth Amendment right. An examination of
252. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318, 320-21 (2002).
253. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 954, 962 (2007); Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 571, 578-79 (2005); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21.
254. Compare Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (holding mentally retarded defendants are cate-
gorically excluded from execution), with Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989)
("[M]ental retardation is a factor that may well lessen a defendant's culpability for a capi-
tal offense. But we cannot conclude today that the Eighth Amendment precludes the ex-
ecution of any mentally retarded person .... .").
255. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (citing Penry, 492 U.S. at 324).
256. Id.
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the role of the death-qualified juror and of the capital prosecutor
reveals that neither is capable of setting aside bias and complying
with the Court's directive in Atkins.
A. Witherspoon Jurors
The death-qualified jury, like any other criminal jury, is com-
prised of ordinary people with no special expertise. While crimi-
nal trials often involve gruesome, difficult stories, the capital jury
is guaranteed to deal with challenging emotions and facts, and
must further grapple with complex instructions on the law.257 To-
tal impartiality is impossible for any juror, and reliable studies
show that jurors resort to arbitrary factors, such as race and reli-
gion, when choosing to impose a death sentence.2 58 Thirty-five
years after Furman v. Georgia, the possible reasons a jury may
impose a death sentence are about as predictable as being "struck
by lightning."259 An arbitrary death sentence would constitute a
due process violation.
The duty of the capital jury is two-fold, deciding the guilt-
innocence phase and deciding the life-death phase, as all capital
trials have a bifurcated sentencing event. 260 Prosecutors may
preemptively remove potential jurors who "would automatically
vote against the imposition of capital punishment."26 1 Any other
rule could result in a jury that has members who are categorically
biased against death, making it impossible for a prosecutor to se-
cure a death sentence even in a fitting case. After the prosecution
preemptively strikes any potential juror who forecloses the possi-
bility of a death sentence, the remaining potential jurors are often
white, male, protestant, and less educated than the overall jury
257. Jos6 Felip6 Anderson, When the Wall Has Fallen: Decades of Failure in the Super-
vision of Capital Juries, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 741, 750 (2000).
258. See William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview
of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1070-71 (1995); Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Dead-
ly Paradox of Capital Jurors, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 371, 380-87 (2001). Almost eighty percent
of all executions have taken place in former slave states, and black defendants are sen-
tenced to death at a disproportionately higher rate than their white cellmates. See Facts
About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.death
penaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf. See generally CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR. &
AuSTIN SARAT, Introduction to FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006).
259. 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
260. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.18 (1968).
261. Id. at 522 n.21.
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pool which included those who would not impose a death sen-
tence.2 62 Death-qualified, or Witherspoon, jurors are more likely to
defer to and trust prosecutors, are less likely to feel sympathy for
the defendant, and are generally more prone to convicting in all
criminal cases.2 63 When charged with determining whether a capi-
tal defendant is mentally retarded or not, death-qualified jurors
are more likely to disregard or misunderstand expert psychiatric
testimony.264 Scholars have begun to focus on how prosecutors can
abuse the death-qualifying voir dire process to select the jury
most likely to convict the defendant. 265 Capital defenders have de-
veloped a system for selecting the jurors least likely to fit the
classic Witherspoon profile.266
With no other feasible option, the Court has held that, even
though it allows for bias, the death-qualifying voir dire practice is
constitutional; the Court has never mandated that the same jury
hear both phases of the capital trial.267 Trial courts have at-
tempted to craft proceedings that do not force the capital defen-
dant to appear before a jury predisposed to convict, to trust the
prosecution's evidence, and to doubt the defendant's evidence. 6
But in most states, the capital defendant will appear before the
262. See Brooke Bulter & Adina W. Wasserman, The Role of Death Qualification in Ve-
nirepersons' Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defense, 36 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1744,
1745-46 (2006) (describing death-qualification status frequency among different demo-
graphic and attitudinal groups); Joseph Carroll, Gallup Poll: Who Supports the Death Pe-
nalty?, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER (Nov. 16, 2004), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
gallup-poll-who-supports-death-penalty (finding that the demographic most likely to be
seated as a death-qualified jury is the same demographic most inclined to impose a death
sentence).
263. See, e.g., Claudia L. Cowan et al., The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors'
Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53, 55
67-68, 73-75 (1984); James R.P. Ogloff & Sonia R. Chopra, Stuck in the Dark Ages: Su-
preme Court Decision Making and Legal Developments, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 379,
391 (2004).
264. See Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries
Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1185-86 (1997).
265. For example, in choosing to pursue its capital charge against Andrea Yates, the
mother charged with drowning her children, critics opined that the prosecution merely
wanted to selected a death-qualified jury, which would be less likely to accept her insanity
defense. In the first trial, the prosecutors were right. See Lisa Teachey, DA Will Seek to
Put Yates on Death Row/Mom Pleads Insanity in Children's Drowning, Hous. CHRON.,
Aug. 9, 2001, at Al.
266. See Matthew Rubenstein, Overview of the Colorado Method in Capital Voir Dire,
CHAMPION, Nov. 2010, at 18.
267. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 170 n.7, 181 (1986); Wainwright v. Witt,
469 U.S. 412, 428-29 (1985).
268. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 324 F. Supp. 2d 311, 331 (D. Mass. 2004).
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same death-qualified jury to argue both the guilt-innocence and
life-death phases of the trial.269
As a general matter, death-qualified jurors are hostile to men-
tal health testimony, defenses, and mitigation; "[flurther, death-
qualified jurors more willingly accept aggravating circumstances
than mitigating factors-many of which involve mental health is-
sues."2 0 Scholars have long argued that the biases of the death-
qualified jury violate due process, especially given the empirical
evidence that those jurors will reject credible evidence of affirma-
tive defenses, such as insanity.271 It is a reasonable inference that
death-qualified jurors will disregard credible, empirical evidence
of mental retardation.2 72
As a solution to the well-recognized problem of death-qualified
juror nullification on credible mental health defenses, scholars fo-
cus on how to pick the best jurors out of the biased jury pool.272
But the mental retardation determination, in the context of
Atkins, could and should be made by the trial court. Unlike the
insanity defense, which is inextricably intertwined with the evi-
dence of guilt,27 4 the categorical exemption from execution guar-
anteed by Atkins should not be considered along with facts estab-
lishing guilt or future dangerousness. If the death-qualified jury
269. See, e.g., Brook A. Thompson, Criminal Law-The Supreme Court Expands the
Witt Principles to Exclude a Juror Who Would Follow the Law. Uttecht v. Brown, 127 S.
Ct. 2218 (2007), 30 U. ARK. LITLE ROCK L. REV. 845, 854 (2008) (detailing states that
enacted a guided jury sentencing scheme in which the same jury decides both the defen-
dant's guilt and sentence, but in two different trials); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 420 U.S.
153, 160, 207 (1975) (upholding a Georgia statutory system in which guilt and sentence
are determined by the same jury at two different trials).
270. Andrea D. Lyon, But He Doesn't Look Retarded: Capital Jury Selection for the
Mentally Retarded Client Not Excluded After Atkins v. Virginia, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 701,
712 (2008) (citing James Luginbuhi & Kathi Middendorf, Death Penalty Beliefs and Ju-
rors' Responses to Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in Capital Trials, 12 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 263, 279 (1988)).
271. See, e.g., Phoebe C. Ellsworth et al., The Death-Qualified Jury and the Defense of
Insanity, 8 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 81, 89-90 (1984); Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C.
Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAW
& HuM. BEHAV. 31, 46-48 (1984).
272. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
273. See, e.g., Ellsworth et al., supra note 271, at 91-92.
274. When determining whether a defendant was insane at the time of the offense, the
jury will weigh medical testimony of the defendant's mental illness with conduct evidence,
such as the defendant's "ability ... to devise and execute a deliberate plan," the way the
defendant appeared to lay observers at the time of the crime, and how the defendant ap-
peared to and acted toward the investigating police officers. People v. Wolff, 394 P.2d 959,
965 (Cal. 1964).
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is unable to resist seeing mental retardation as "a loophole allow-
ing too many guilty people to go free,"'11 then, to preserve the due
process guarantee, the trial court must step in to make the fac-
tual determination that will result in the categorical exemption
from death.
The unified competency assessment serves a purpose without
undermining the role of the jury in capital cases. 276 Even the best-
informed capital juror would likely be confused by how he should
assess the evidence of mental retardation against evidence of ag-
gravating factors of future dangerousness. The Atkins Court de-
tailed that its Penry rule had been a failure because it left to the
death-qualified jury the task of sorting out whether mental retar-
dation should be a mitigating factor or an aggravating factor.277
The Court's own justification for its categorical exemption of
the mentally retarded from a death sentence is convoluted and
mixes issues of culpability, diminished capacity, and ability to
perform and assist at trial.278 Given the mentally retarded defen-
dant's unique inability to perform at trial and jurors' likelihood to
view the mental retardation diagnosis as an insufficient excuse, 279
the net result will be the jury disagreeing with the Court's con-
clusion that diminished capacity equates to diminished culpabili-
ty. And, as with Atkins himself, the jury could hear overwhelm-
ing evidence of mental retardation and simply disregard it, and
sentence the defendant to death.280 That result, post-Atkins, vi-
olates the Eighth Amendment.29 ' And the process that allowed the
jury to reach a verdict that violated the Eighth Amendment itself
violates the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process. 82
275. See Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 271, at 45.
276. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 604 (2002). When the Court extended its rule
from Apprendi to capital cases, it held that the jury must determine the aggravating fac-
tors before the defendant could be sentenced to death. Id. at 588-89. The unified compe-
tency assessment theorized in this article does not interfere with the holding in Ring,
since mental retardation should only be viewed as a mitigating factor by the sentencing
jury. Ring does not demand that the jury must find mitigating factors.
277. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
278. See id. at 306-07, 320-21.
279. Id. at 320-21.
280. See id. at 310.
281. Id. at 321.
282. The Court deals with due process questions in the admissibility context, determin-
ing what kinds of evidence should be presented to the jury. See Simmons v. South Caroli-
na, 512 U.S. 154, 156 (1994) (reversing after the trial court denied the defendant's instruc-
tion on life without parole); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4, 8 (1986) (reversing
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B. Prosecutors
Prosecutors abuse their discretion when they choose to seek
death in order to seat a death-disposed jury.283 "The duty of the
prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict."28 4 Moreover,
prosecutors should "seek to reform and improve the administra-
tion of criminal justice," and "must exercise sound discretion in
the performance of [their] functions.""8 One way that prosecutors
could "seek to reform and improve the administration of criminal
justice" would be to ask the trial court to make a pretrial deter-
mination of whether the capital defendant is mentally retarded
and should be categorically excluded from a death sentence.
Prosecutors should make an independent probable cause de-
termination before proceeding on any charges against the defen-
dant and should not pursue prosecution in cases where the evi-
dence is insufficient to support a conviction. 286 In making the
decision to pursue a charge, the prosecutor must consider his own
"reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty."8 7 Thus, in
the Atkins context, the prosecutor must consider his own reason-
able doubts about the capital defendant's "competency" for execu-
tion.
The ABA's commentary on the special responsibilities of a
prosecutor describes the prosecutor as a "minister of justice."288
The first Oxford English Dictionary definition of "minister" is the
most relevant: "[a] servant, attendant.... One who waits upon,
or ministers to the wants of another."289 He is no mere advocate
after the trial court denied the defendant the opportunity to present evidence of good be-
havior in prison); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 351, 362 (1977) (reversing after the
trial court denied defendant the opportunity to review and rebut the contents of a presen-
tence investigation report).
283. J. Amy Dillard, At His Discretion (N.): "To Be Disposed of as He Thinks Fit; At His
Disposal, At His Mercy; Unconditionally, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1295, 1304-05
(2007) (reviewing ANGELA J. DAvIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE (2007)) (discussing the ability of
prosecutors to obtain juries inclined to adopt the death penalty, and citing the Andrea
Yates prosecution as a prime example).
284. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993).
285. Id. at 3-1.2(d), 3-1.2(b).
286. Id. at 3-3.9(a).
287. Id. at 3-3.9(b)(i).
288. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (1983) (amended 2008).
289. 9 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 817-18 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds.,
2d ed. 1989).
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for his position, and the responsibility carries a specific obligation
to see that each defendant "is accorded procedural justice, [and]
that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence." 290 JuS-
tice Harry Blackmun explicitly found that prosecutors could not
shoulder this heavy burden in the death context: "Rather than
continue to coddle the Court's delusion that the desired level of
fairness has been achieved . .. I feel morally and intellectually ob-
ligated simply to concede that the death penalty experiment has
failed."2 91
The prosecutor bears the sole responsibility for setting the
death machine in motion, and in high profile capital cases, politi-
cal prosecutors are most susceptible to community pressure for
revenge. 292 Federal prosecutors must work through a detailed re-
port before seeking death, including the preparation of a "Death
Penalty Evaluation," vetted by the Attorney General.293 In making
the determination of whether the decision to seek death is appro-
priate, the charging U.S. Attorney must weigh the mitigating fac-
tors against the aggravating factors. 294 He may not ignore the fact
of mental retardation; nor does this evaluative duty disappear
once the decision is made. 295 The prosecutor has a continuing re-
sponsibility to be a minister of justice.296
290. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (1983) (amended 2008).
291. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from deni-
al of certiorari).
292. ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR
77-78, 85-89 (2007) (detailing the controlling power of prosecutors in capital cases as well
as the experience of two black prosecutors who choose not be seek death in high-profile
capital prosecutions).
293. U.S. Attorney Manual, Capital Crimes, 9-10.040, 9-10.080, available at http://www
.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia.reading-room/usam/title9/10mcrm.htm.
294. Id. at 9-10.080(A)(5).
295. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a) (2006).
296. While the cost of prosecuting and defending a capital case should be irrelevant in
a fair system, states may experience a "systemic breakdown in the public defender system"
that may be leading to Sixth Amendment violations of the right to a speedy trial and the
right to counsel. See Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. _, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009) (quoting
State v. Brillon, 955 A.2d 1108, 1111 (Vt. 2008)). Categorically excluding mentally re-
tarded defendants from capital trials where a death sentence is a possibility would dra-
matically reduce the cost of prosecution and defense, since neither side would need to pre-
pare a sentencing case, nor retain the traditional expert witnesses who testify during the
sentencing phase. Determining Mental Retardation in Pennsylvania, THE STAND DOWN
TEXAS PROJECT (Aug. 30, 2010), http://standdown.typepad.com/weblog/2010/08/determing-
mental-retardation-in-pennsylvania.html. In fact, many capital defendants who go to trial
rather than entering a guilty plea do so to make an argument that the jury should spare
their life, not to make a robust argument of innocence. Michael C. Dorf, Why Al Qaeda
Conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui's Guilty Plea Probably Won't Save His Life, FINDLAW
1006 [Vol. 45:961
MENTALLY RETARDED DEFENDANTS
Presuming that a prosecutor charges capital murder when the
facts alleged fit the statutory crime, the prosecutor must still dec-
lare whether he seeks death as a possible penalty or whether he
will proceed with life without parole as the only sentencing option
for the jury.29 7 It is in this continuing duty to evaluate whether
death is an appropriate option that prosecutors bear the most
burden. When the prosecutor learns that the capital defendant
has significant mental deficiencies that may render him unsuita-
ble for execution under Atkins, the prosecutor should be "[a] ser-
vant ... who ... ministers to the wants of another."298 His own in-
terests aside, he must carry out his specific obligation to see that
the defendant is not subjected to a penalty for which the defen-
dant is not suited. In the way that a prosecutor would abuse his
discretion by seeking death against a juvenile post-Roper, so too
does a prosecutor abuse his discretion when he seeks death
against the mentally deficient defendant, post-Atkins.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the past thirty-five years the Supreme Court of the United
States has fetishized procedural due process and theoretical juri-
sprudence in the guise of "evolving standards of decency," while
wholly ignoring substantive due process in its review of capital
cases. But the twenty-first century opinions, in the context of all
of the Court's post-Furman cases, set the stage for a new method
for determining adjudicative competence. Drawing on the histori-
cal approach to achieving substantive due process in criminal
cases, trial courts could afford capital defendants a detailed, pre-
trial competency evaluation to assess their factual, rational, deci-
sional, and emotional ability to assist counsel, along with a men-
tal retardation determination. This honest assessment of whether
a defendant is competent to be sentenced to death and executed
would restore fairness to a process that is rife with bias at the
hands of Witherspoon jurors. If the trial court determines that the
defendant is incompetent and is unable to demonstrate a factual,
rational, decisional, and emotional ability to assist counsel, the
capital trial may not begin. 299 If the trial court determines that
(Apr. 27, 2005), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20050427.html.
297. See U.S. Attorney Manual, supra note 293, at 9-10.080.
298. 9 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 289, at 817-18.
299. See David Freedman, When is a Capitally Charged Defendant Incompetent to
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the defendant is mentally retarded, but is otherwise competent to
stand trial, the capital trial may begin, but the court may not
present the option of death to the jury. In essence, the capital tri-
al of a mentally retarded defendant proceeds like all other trials,
with a guilt or innocence decision by the jury and with the court
imposing the sentence.
The unified competency assessment requires a contextual
analysis to satisfy the due process requirement. Chief among the
context factors is the inability of the mentally retarded defendant
to escape the bias of the death-qualified jury. Moreover, if the ex-
ecution of a mentally retarded (or juvenile) defendant does not
comport with the core values of the criminal justice system, nei-
ther does the mockery of a trial wherein those categorically ex-
empted defendants must struggle to fight for their lives. To truly
accomplish an assessment worthy of constitutional due process,
the trial court would need to view the competency assessment in
favorem vitae-in favor of life. The marginal competency es-
poused by the Court in Drope simply has no place in capital liti-
gation. The complexity of the bifurcated trial, the depth of the
emotional issues that must be explored to adequately prepare any
respectable mitigation case, the vexing issues of coping with Wi-
therspoon jurors, the need for a more clinical approach to assess-
ing mental retardation in order to satisfy the Court's desire for
moral dignity, and the end of life issues that conflate with exist-
ing mental illness and death row syndrome to produce mad men
taking the dead man's walk all compound to necessitate that trial
courts should meet the task of making the competency determi-
nation with the fervor of a defense attorney trying to save his
client's life.
Stand Trial?, 32 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 127, 127-28 (2009). The determination of com-
petency is a legal determination, and the Court has never delineated different levels of
competency for different grades of offenses. An argument that the level of competency ne-
cessary to stand trial for capital murder is higher than the level necessary to stand trial
for a misdemeanor or any other felony is the subject of a work-in-progress by the author. A
key feature of support for this assertion is that state legislatures require trial counsel to
be more competent to represent defendants charged with more serious crimes, and many
states have special requirements for death-qualified trial, appellate, and habeas counsel.
See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26(B)(1) (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163.7 (Repl. Vol.
2008).
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